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Chapter One 
Meriting a Response: Accounting for “Seductive” Artworks† 
 
 I. An Attractive Claim 
Many artworks use artistic techniques to elicit responses. In Das Boot’s final scene, for instance, the 
U96’s crew is strafed into oblivion following several treacherous months at sea. The scene does not 
merely prescribe that we imagine a U-Boat crew dock and be killed. It also attempts to elicit pity and 
despair from us. As Aristotle noted, these attempts are sometimes unsuccessful: 
 
A perfect tragedy should […] imitate actions which excite pity and fear […]. It follows plainly, in 
the first place, that the change of  fortune presented must not be the spectacle of  a virtuous man 
brought from prosperity to adversity: for this moves neither pity nor fear; it merely shocks us. Nor, 
again, that of  a bad man passing from adversity to prosperity: for nothing can be more alien to the 
spirit of  Tragedy; […] it neither satisfies the moral sense nor calls for pity or fear. Nor, again, 
should the downfall of  the utter villain be exhibited. A plot of  this kind would doubtless satisfy 
the moral sense, but it would inspire neither pity nor fear; for pity is aroused by unmerited 
misfortune of  a man like ourselves. (Aristotle 1961, 75-76) 
 
If  the protagonist is poorly chosen, her downfall will fail to elicit pity and fear. Extrapolating from 
tragedy, ignoring the contemporary phrasing, and using ‘invite’ as shorthand for ‘attempt to elicit’, one 
may attribute to Aristotle the following principle: 
 
                                            
†  Special thanks to the following for helpful conversations and feedback: Ken Walton, Rohan Sud, Janum Sethi, Chip 
Sebens, Alex Neill, Jeremy Lent, Meena Krishnamurthy, Zoë Johnson King, Dan Jacobson, Susan Feagin, Victor Dura-
Vila, Daniel Drucker, Gregg Crane, Sarah Buss, and Paul Boswell. Thanks also to audiences at the University of  
Michigan’s Aesthetics Discussion Group (2014) and philosophy department (2015), the University of  Kent’s Aesthetics, 
Normativity, and Reasons conference, the University of  Murcia’s Art and Negative Emotions conference, the University of  
Southampton’s philosophy department, and the annual meetings of  the British Society of  Aesthetics (2015) and 
American Society for Aesthetics (2015). Finally, thanks to Berys Gaut, whose work inspired this paper. 
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 ELICITATION PRINCIPLE 
A work that invites but fails to elicit a response in appreciators through artistic means is to that 
extent aesthetically flawed. 
 
An obvious objection to this principle is that the failure might lie with appreciators, not the work; 
appreciators might be obtuse or in the wrong mood. Rephrasing the claim in normative rather than 
causal terms avoids the objection: 
 
MERIT PRINCIPLE 
A work that invites an unmerited response in appreciators through artistic means is to that extent 
aesthetically flawed. 
 
Like Aristotle, recent proponents of  the Merit Principle have also focused on ethical considerations 
bearing on a response’s meritedness.1 However, other types of  consideration can render a response 
unmerited. Also discussing tragedy, Hume provides an example: 
 
An action, represented in tragedy, may be too bloody and atrocious.  It may excite such movements 
of  horror as will not soften into pleasure; […] Such is that action represented in the *Ambitious 
Stepmother*, where a venerable old man, raised to the height of  fury and despair, rushes against a 
pillar, and striking his head upon it, besmears it all over with mingled brains and gore. (Hume 1757, 
198-9) 
 
Too much gore and the work will elicit disgust rather than the peculiar pleasure Hume thinks tragedy 
affords. But the point is general; for various reasons, “Horror fictions may be unfrightening, comedies 
unamusing, thrillers unthrilling” (Gaut, 1998, 194). Nor is the principle restricted to works inviting 
genre-specific responses. Works of  all kinds can fall flat in this way, by inviting responses necessary to 
appreciate the work, yet undeserved. The Merit Principle captures a general respect in which works can 
                                            
1 Berys Gaut is probably the most prominent contemporary advocate, whose interest in aesthetic moralism means he 
focuses on ethical cases. See Gaut (1998) and (2007). Gaut’s forerunner, David Hume also discusses an ethical case in 
his famous remarks in Of  the Standard of  Taste about our inability to “bear an affection” as directed to characters we 
“plainly discover to be blameable” (Hume 1757a, 236-237). Noël Carroll, appears to support the same principle, though 
he disagrees with Gaut about which considerations bear on a response’s warrant, and how; see especially (Carroll 1996, 
233), (Carroll 377-380). 
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 fail on their own terms.2 
 What does ‘merited’ mean in this context? For the Merit Principle to be plausible, considerations 
bearing on the kind of  meritedness the principle concerns must be all and only those relevant to the 
aesthetic value of  the work. At minimum, I should think this rules out so-called state-given, as opposed 
to object-given, reasons;3 if  a kidnapper commands me to be amused at gunpoint, this may make 
amusement merited in some sense—e.g. when meritedness is determined by every kind of  
consideration—but not in the sense required by the Merit Principle. Which kinds of  considerations are 
aesthetically relevant, and thus which count for the Merit Principle is a fraught question on which I take 
no position here. Nor need I, as we will see in §3.1. For, however we circumscribe these considerations, 
provided that some count, the problem I identify still arises. That said, for the sake of  vivid examples, 
I will proceed as though ethical considerations count, even while acknowledging that this is far from 
settled. 
 The Merit Principle is both attractive and endorsed by important figures. Moreover, its truth is vital 
to the soundness of  the best argument for “ethicism”, the most carefully worked out position in the 
debate concerning the relevance of  ethical values to aesthetic ones in artworks.4 One should take it 
seriously for that reason alone. That notwithstanding, in the next section I argue that it leads to 
paradox. I consider some ultimately unsuccessful ways to solve the paradox in §3 and §4, before 
concluding that we should abandon the principle as currently formulated. I close by considering the 
art-critical challenge seductive works pose and by revising the Merit Principle to avoid paradox for those 
wishing to preserve it in spirit. According to this revision, it is insofar as a work attempts to make 
merited, rather than merely elicit, an unmerited response that it is aesthetically flawed. 
 Before I launch into the discussion, let me acknowledge two issues. First, I have phrased my 
discussion in terms of  aesthetic value. I could just as well have phrased it in terms of  artistic value. I 
am not thereby committed to thinking these kinds of  values are identical (they are not), just that one 
can formulate essentially the same paradox for either. There are interesting questions about how these 
                                            
2  Gaut, for instance, thinks of  the failure in this way; see (Gaut 1998, 194) and (Gaut 2007, 231). 
3 See (Parfit 2011, 27, 50-51, 420-432). We have to be careful with this distinction, however, since “object-given” suggests 
that the relevant art object must supply all the relevant considerations; but artworks sometimes legitimately rely on 
external objects to make invited responses merited. The film The Motorcyle Diaries, about Che Guevara’s early travels 
around South America, exploits the dramatic irony of  Guevara’s ignorance about his profound future as a revolutionary 
to give a gravitas to some scenes that would otherwise be absent. The regard these scenes invite is clearly merited in 
part by features of  Che Guevara’s actual life, not merely features of  the work—at least not narrowly construed. The 
question, whether such “externally”  supplied considerations are aesthetically relevant is touched on in (Thomson-
Jones 2012,  283). Looking ahead, it is for this reason that I opt for ‘make merited’ rather than ‘merit’ in the final 
section of  the paper. 
4  I am referring to Berys Gaut’s Merited Response Argument (Gaut, 2007). 
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 kinds of  value relate, but they are not my questions here. Second, I am assuming that it is at minimum 
an epistemic possibility that aesthetic criticism, like other forms of  normative reasoning, is amenable 
to general principles. Thankfully, this assumption is not wildly implausible, even though I understand 
why some may doubt it. To those who do, I will not offer any arguments to persuade them otherwise. 
They may treat the proceeding discussion in a lighter vein, encouraged by the knowledge that it 
includes lots of  action, violence, and even carnal relations… albeit with a pig. Yes, I said a pig. Sadly, 
there are no explosions, except perhaps of  readers’ minds; the philosophy department did not have 
the budget for it. 
 
 II. Merit and “Seduction”: a Paradox 
Ben is an overt misogynist, racist, and serial killer. He goes from house to house injuring and killing 
the inhabitants and stealing their valuables. A film crew records his crimes and matter-of-fact 
commentary. Ben is the protagonist of  Man Bites Dog, a black comedy “mockumentary” whose comic 
premise consists in taking a style often reserved for documenting ordinary people’s day jobs and 
applying it, fictionally, to an eccentric psychopath. After a while, the fictional crew members become 
increasingly involved in Ben’s crimes before finally joining Ben in committing a sexual assault, making 
the victim’s partner watch at gun-point. The film is what I call a “seductive artwork”.5 Such works 
constitutively invite a response r1 to depicted events or features, before inviting a repudiatory second-
order response r2 to r1—or so I claim. Man Bites Dog, for instance, invites amusement at Ben’s violence 
until the sexual assault sharply ends the revelry, inviting appreciators to feel shame about that 
amusement.6 
 Seductive works enable a reductio against the Merit Principle. Specifically, the principle entails, 
implausibly, that seductive works are necessarily aesthetically flawed. The argument is simple. To count 
as seductive, a work must invite a first-order response and a second-order response that repudiates it. 
In order for the second-order response to be merited, the first-order response which it repudiates 
must be unmerited. Therefore, seductive works must invite an unmerited first-order response. Thus, 
                                            
5 The name is adapted from Berys Gaut’s (2007) term for the strategy such works employ: The “seduction strategy”. 
The genre is first invoked, as far as I can tell, by Matthew Kieran who also discusses Man Bites Dog to support his 
‘cognitive immoralism’. See (Kieran 2006, 138-140). 
6  This characterization is stipulative in the sense that there is a class of  artworks I mean to capture by it, even though 
we naturally call other kinds of  artworks “seductive”, such as those that merely get us doubt our responses, rather than 
repudiate them. But the characterization is not stipulative in that I could be persuaded, in principle, to characterize their 
structure differently. 
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 according to the Merit Principle, they must be aesthetically flawed. But this seems absurd.7 
 The Merit Principle is compelling and enjoys a pedigree one should take seriously. So, we face a 
dialectical problem articulable as three independently plausible but jointly inconsistent propositions: 
 
1) (Merit Principle) A work that invites an unmerited response in appreciators through artistic 
means is to that extent aesthetically flawed. 
 
2) Artistically seductive works necessarily invite an unmerited response in appreciators through 
artistic means. 
 
3) Artistically seductive works are not necessarily aesthetically flawed. 
 
Consistency demands rejecting one of  these propositions. Because the Merit Principle represents the 
threatened tradition, so to speak, I will devote the following two sections to considering objections to 
the other propositions. Moreover, since my account of  seductive artworks represents the paradox-
inducing innovation, my discussion principally concerns proposition (2). I note before proceeding that 
while I suggest a potential solution to the paradox in the final section, and consider solving it 
important, my main interest is in exploring the contours of  the Merit Principle, seductive artworks, and 
the paradox they jointly generate. Vanishingly few mentions, let alone philosophical discussions, of  
seductive artworks exist. As such, the proposals I consider represent my attempt, without a literature 
to draw upon, to articulate prima facie plausible solutions to the paradox. Just one is attributable to an 
actual person. 
 
 III. Proposals: Rejecting Proposition (2) 
  3.1 The Autonomist Proposal 
Rejecting (2) amounts to claiming that artistically seductive works need not invite an unmerited 
response. Perhaps most straightforwardly, one could deny the relevance of  ethical considerations to 
                                            
7 A small caveat. The entailment does not quite go through as stated. The Merit Principle says only that works using artistic 
means to invite unmerited responses are thereby aesthetically flawed. This is to exclude cases where, for instance, a 
painting invites sadness by tacking on a note reading ‘Feel sad!’; such invitations (at least typically) would be 
insufficiently integrated to count as aesthetic flaws (Gaut 2007, 84-89).  So one must restrict the claim to seductive 
works that employ artistic means to make their first-order invitations. Every seductive work with which I am familiar 
is like this, so the argument’s scope is probably only logically diminished. 
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 the meritedness of  responses. One could embrace a kind of  autonomism according to which whether 
a response to an artwork, or even just a seductive artwork, is merited is a “purely aesthetic” question 
in which ethics plays no part. Being amused by Man Bites Dog’s Ben, on this proposal, is merited in any 
aesthetically relevant sense, albeit ethically criticizable. 
 There are two faults with this approach. First, it only postpones the problem, since seductive works 
can exploit non-ethical considerations. Proposition (2) remains true of  such works, generating an 
isomorphic paradox merely reduced in scope. Shaggy Dog stories (at least some of  them) are seductive 
works that exploit epistemic considerations. Initially appreciators take narrators of  such stories to be 
telling a story in good faith, until they realize that the story’s meandering plot leads nowhere and that 
they are the butt of  an elaborate prank. Pliny’s The Natural History furnishes another example: 
 
[Parrhasius], it is said, entered into a pictorial contest with Zeuxis, who represented some grapes, 
painted so naturally that the birds flew towards the spot where the picture was exhibited. Parrhasius, 
on the other hand, exhibited a curtain, drawn with such singular truthfulness, that Zeuxis, elated 
with the judgment which had passed upon his work by the birds, haughtily demanded that the 
curtain should be drawn aside to let the picture be seen. Upon finding his mistake, with a great 
degree of  ingenuous candour he admitted that he had been surpassed, for that whereas he himself  
had only deceived the birds, Parrhasius had deceived him, an artist.  (Pliny the Elder 1857, p. 251) 
 
(Some) Shaggy Dog stories invite audiences (victims?) to feel curiosity at the first order and 
embarrassment about that curiosity at the second. One might understand Parrhasius’ painting as 
inviting a false belief  about a curtain at the first order in order to invite the realization that this belief  
was precipitous (and premised on underestimating Parrhasius’ ability) at the second order. One could 
call such works “epistemically seductive works”. Could one not be an autonomist about epistemic 
considerations, too? Perhaps. But since seductive works might exploit many kinds of  considerations—
not just ethical and epistemic, but conventional, prudential, political, not to mention aesthetic, this 
move will work only if  one excludes every kind of  consideration from determining the meritedness of  
responses. This is hopeless for two reasons. First, it is absurd to exclude aesthetic considerations from 
determining a response’s aesthetically relevant kind of  meritedness. Moreover, it is clear that seductive 
works can and do exploit aesthetic considerations. Many works parodying artistic practices get 
appreciators to see that their initial aesthetic judgements about the target practice are unmerited. A 
teenager recently placed his watch and sunglasses on the floor of  the Dallas Museum of  Modern Art 
6
 in order to fool visitors into thinking they formed part of  an exhibit (Jones 2015). While not a full-
fledged artwork, nor wholly seductive, one can see how such a display could be mobilized to create a 
seductive work. Indeed, much contemporary art going back to Duchamp’s Fountain contains enough 
irony and anxiety about artistic legitimacy to offer the beginnings of  seduction in my sense. A clear 
example of  an aesthetically seductive work is furnished by a mid-90’s UK advertisement for 
Boddington’s Ale. The short film exquisitely imitates the ultra-aestheticized style of  the era’s Calvin 
Klein advertisements until a stern-faced Adonis, serenaded by operatic singing, turns in slow motion 
toward the camera with a fish on his head. It invites us, at the first order, to be awed by the decadent 
“beauty” of  its hypersexualized black and white imagery, only to reveal the absurdity of  that awe by 
exposing the style as pretentious and, indeed, comic. Second, eliminating every kind of  consideration 
would leave us with none to determine a response’s meritedness at all, meaning the merited/unmerited 
distinction would cease to track a difference. This approach would therefore not so much save the 
Merit Principle as render it unintelligible. 
 The second problem with the autonomist proposal is more fundamental than the first: preserving 
meritedness at the first order by banishing ethical considerations that undermine it merely relocates 
the difficulty. For, one rescues the first-order response only by deserting the second-order one. 
Consider Man Bites Dog again. If  the first-order amusement is merited after all, the second-order 
response (shame about that amusement) is no longer merited. This is because this shame is only 
merited if  its object, the amusement, is not. Thus, were the amusement merited after all, the work 
would still invite an unmerited response, only at the second order instead. In short, the autonomist’s 
path away from (2) leads right back to it. 
 Of  course, a work could exploit considerations not relevant to a response’s meritedness in the 
aesthetically restricted sense in which I intend term. To see how, suppose for argument’s sake that 
ethical considerations never bear on a response’s meritedness. A work could, then, still exploit ethical 
considerations to induce a repudiatory response in its appreciators, without falling afoul of  the Merit 
Principle. Man Bites Dog might invite perfectly merited amusement and then invite appreciators to 
recognize that the amusement is shameful because inappropriate in the broader sense that includes 
ethical considerations. That is, the amusement might be broadly inappropriate in a way that, ex hypothesi, 
has no bearing on whether it is merited. The possibility of  such works, which we might call “quasi-
seductive”, does not undo the paradox however. As described above, there are truly seductive works 
in my sense that exploit meritedness-relevant considerations to execute their seductive strategy. The 
paradox remains for these works. Moreover, if  we take the stipulation seriously—namely, that we are 
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 engaged in an appreciative practice that holds ethical norms in abeyance—the idea that the 
appreciator’s amusement at Man Bites Dog is inappropriate, even broadly speaking, is somewhat 
strained. The appreciator might legitimately dismiss ethical criticism of  her amusement, and any 
inclination to be ashamed of  it, as beside the point. The response, she might legitimately insist, is 
merited according to the practice-internal norms of  appreciation (even if  the entire practice is itself  
ethically criticizable for spurning ethical norms). The extent to which it seems she cannot properly 
dismiss the finger-wagging, is probably the extent to which we cannot help but think that ethical 
considerations actually do bear those practice-internal norms—on meritedness—contrary to the 
stipulation. It is difficult to quarantine considerations widely thought to be categorical, after all, even 
for the sake of  argument. 
 
  3.2 The All Things Considered Proposal 
A different approach to rejecting (2) is worth considering in part because it will help sharpen up the 
Merit Principle. One might claim that seductive works need only invite a response flawed in some respect 
rather than unmerited all things considered, much as donating $10 rather than $50 can be legitimately 
criticized, yet permissible. A seductive work could then invite a sub-optimal but merited first-order 
response and a merited second-order response. This second-order response would just take the first-
order response’s criticizable aspect as its object, accounting for the seductive work’s structure without 
paradox. 
 The proposal’s plausibility, however, presupposes an unsophisticated understanding of  
meritedness. True, responses can be merited all things considered, yet regrettable. But if  one understands 
meritedness in subtler pro tanto terms such that, for instance, a response is unmerited insofar as it is 
unethical, the problem reappears. And clearly the most interesting reading of  the Merit Principle invokes 
meritedness pro tanto, not meritedness all things considered.8 This is because a work is aesthetically 
worse, if  at all, not (merely) for inviting responses unmerited all things considered, but insofar as a 
response it invites is unmerited. Many responses, and the extent to which they are merited, come in 
degrees. Flaws in comic timing, for instance, may make a joke less funny, and thereby aesthetically 
worse, without robbing it of  all humour. Let me therefore clarify the Merit Principle as follows: 
 
For any work w that invites a response r in appreciators through artistic means, w is aesthetically 
                                            
8  The all things considered principle is strictly weaker than the pro tanto one. Only the latter suffices for Gaut’s influential 
Merited Response Argument for ethicism. 
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 flawed insofar as r is unmerited to any degree. 
 
  3.3 The Merited All Things Considered Proposal 2.0 
A different suggestion, in some respects analogous to the last, is that claiming a seductive work invites 
an unmerited first-order response presupposes too microscopic a view. The aesthetically relevant 
response a seductive work invites, on this proposal, is to the work as a whole, the response consisting in 
“seeing the error of  one’s ways”, for instance; examining the work’s individual invitations to respond 
misses this important point. Successful seductive works are not necessarily aesthetically flawed because 
they successfully attempt to elicit a merited response to the work as a whole. Thus, in any theoretically 
relevant sense, such works do not invite an unmerited response at all. 
 One problem with the proposal is that some uses of  the seductive strategy do not span entire 
works. Early in the cinematic version of  La Cage aux Folles, for instance, the middle-aged homosexual 
proprietor of  a Saint-Tropez drag club, Renato sends his star attraction and partner, Albin (“Zaza”) 
onto stage before returning to their apartment. Here he readies himself  for a guest. He has a maid lay 
out champagne, tidies a bouquet of  roses, applies powder, faces a photograph of  himself  toward the 
doorway, and dims the lights. As the dashing young visitor rings the bell, Renato checks his reflection 
once more and opens the door. The boy, Laurent enters. They embrace. Renato tells Laurent he is 
more handsome than ever, plays with his long hair, and kisses his forehead. Renato assures Laurent 
that Zaza is performing and that they will be alone for at least two hours. When Laurent tells Renato 
he is getting married, Renato rises from the couch and utters a crestfallen ‘Non!’. At this stage, we are 
seemingly to believe that Renato has lured this boy to his apartment while his oblivious partner is 
occupied elsewhere. However, shortly after, we learn that Laurent is not Renato’s lover but his son, 
and that what appeared to be erotic intimations were innocent displays of  paternal affection. The film 
cleverly exploits widespread stereotypes, especially prevalent when released in 1978, of  (male) 
homosexuals as promiscuous and pedophilic, thereby inviting us to think Renato a sexual predator. 
Upon accentuating Renato’s innocence, it invites us to feel shame at our hasty judgement. Importantly 
for my purposes, the film is seductive for only one scene. Therefore, even if  the current proposal were 
plausible, it would not fit works like La Cage aux Folles.9 
 In light of  this problem, one might insist on individuating responses at the level of  the relevant 
seductive portion of  the artwork instead, whether a scene or the whole work. But there is a more 
                                            
9  I am indebted to Jamie Tappenden for this excellent example. 
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 fundamental objection: why consider only such coarse-grained responses when evaluating seductive 
artworks? In other cases, an artwork’s finer-grained invitations (at least of  the right kind) are always 
relevant to its aesthetic value. A comedy, for instance, might succeed on the whole by amusing us. But if  
a poorly executed set of  jokes—i.e. invitations for unmerited amusement—is among its contents, this 
ordinarily diminishes the work’s overall aesthetic value. There are apparently no grounds for treating 
seductive works any differently, except that doing so resolves the paradox. Unsupplemented, this is 
entirely ad hoc. 
 
  3.4 The Shifting Standards Proposal 
Perhaps the structure of  seductive works requires more nuance than (2) suggests. I said that a seductive 
work is one that invites a response r to depicted events or features, and a second-order response that 
repudiates r. How can one amend this account? 
 The difficulty lies in the fact that it seems successful seductive works paradoxically make the 
unmerited merited, making it in some sense appropriate to respond in a way that is in some sense 
inappropriate. One way to make this intelligible, and thus to reject proposition (2), is by indexing 
meritedness to multiple standards. An analogy: the 1954 US overthrow of  Guatemala’s government 
was appropriate according to the de facto standards of  the Monroe Doctrine, but not international law. 
Might different responses to artworks also sometimes answer to distinct standards?  
 §3.1 showed that placing considerations outside the work-internal standards of  appreciation only 
postponed the problem of  reconciling seductive works to the Merit Principle. A more promising 
approach posits multiple different work-internal standards. One possibility is that seductive works create 
multiple standards by executing a perspectival shift—for example, by altering operative genre 
conventions mid-work. Man Bites Dog, on this proposal, might switch from black comedy to realist 
drama, for instance. 
 This genre-shifting characterization of  seductive works offers a promising way to preserve the 
Merit Principle while explaining how such works make the “unmerited merited”. Since seductive works 
shift from one set of  genre conventions (g1) to another (g2), they realize two different work-internal 
standards. Seductive works, then, invite a first-order response (r1) that is merited by the standard of  g1, 
before switching to g2 in inviting a second-order response (r2). r2 takes r1 as its object and, by the g2 
standard, is merited provided r1 is not merited; this provision is secured by the fact that r1 is unmerited 
by the standard of  g2. To illustrate, Man Bites Dog invites amusement merited by the black comedy 
standards operative as the work makes the invitation. The film then switches to a realist drama standard 
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 in inviting shame about that amusement. This shame is only merited provided that its object, the 
amusement, is not. This provision is secured by the fact that the amusement is not merited by the 
realist drama standard. Thus each response a seductive work invites can be wholly merited according 
to its own standard, meaning seductive works need not be aesthetically flawed, preserving the Merit 
Principle without theoretical strain. 
 Is it not a problem that r1 is unmerited by the standard of  g2 while g2 is operative—that the 
amusement in Man Bites Dog, for example, is unmerited by the realist drama standard? For, there is still 
a response unmerited by one of  the work-internal standards, reviving the paradox. A friendly 
amendment solves this issue: 
 
TEMPORAL MERIT PRINCIPLE 
For any work w that invites a response r in appreciators through artistic means, w is aesthetically 
flawed insofar as r is unmerited to any degree according to the standards of  meritedness operative 
when r is invited. 
 
Note that this alteration is not ad hoc. The motivation behind Aristotle’s and Hume’s claims is that lack 
of  meritedness undermines one’s ability to respond to a work on its terms. But the fact that a response 
is unmerited by a standard not even operative when the response is invited interferes in no way with 
this ability. 
 Sadly, however, the proposal does not work. Crucial to the proposal is the temporal separation of  
each invitation; the first-order invitation precedes the second-order one. However, nothing in the 
nature of  seductive works or my characterization of  them rules out their simultaneously inviting 
responses of  differing orders. Indeed, some seductive works do just this. In ‘The National Anthem’, 
the first episode of  Charlie Brooker’s Black Mirror, an anonymous kidnapper abducts and threatens to 
kill a British Princess unless Britain’s Prime Minister has sexual intercourse with a pig on live 
television.10 As the story progresses and the deadline nears, we witness the unthinkable demand 
become thinkable before finally, compelled by opinion polls and PR aides, the Prime Minister yields. 
A central theme of  the episode is the enabling role contemporary technology plays in turning the 
debasing of  a human being into an item of  casual consumption and titillation. News of  the demand 
quickly spreads via social media, and the humiliating act is broadcast nationwide, the entire country 
                                            
10  I assure the reader the recent allegation that PM David Cameron put his genitals into a dead pig’s mouth came, 
hilariously, after I chose this example. 
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 gripped for its duration (“over an hour”, as one character reveals). Yet, crucially the show depicts many 
viewers as coming to realize the horror of  their voyeurism. 
 As its title suggests, Black Mirror presents a dark reflection (as from a smartphone or flat-screen 
TV) of  our own technologically saturated world. ‘The National Anthem’ does this principally through 
its seductive structure. As one watches the fictional citizens stare at their TV with unsavoury relish, so 
one realizes one is doing precisely the same thing. The work both invites one to indulge a voyeuristic 
desire to see the sordid act, and yet to also recognize, by witnessing others’ voyeurism, this desire’s 
perversity. Importantly, ‘The National Anthem’ invites both orders of  response simultaneously; call it 
a “synchronic” seductive work. 
 Such works thwart the latest proposal. Non-synchronic seductive works invite the two orders of  
responses at different times. This allows one set of  genre conventions (g1) to operate while one 
response (r1) is invited and another (g2) when the other response (r2) is. This accounts for how both 
responses can be merited at their time of  invitation: r1 is merited according to g1, r2 is merited according 
to g2. That each invited response is unmerited according to a standard not operative at the time of  
invitation does not matter, since the meritedness of  each response is indexed to its time of  invitation. 
Synchronic seductive works, however, eliminate this temporal separation. Both g1 and g2 are operative 
simultaneously, rendering r1 and r2 unmerited according to g2 and g1, respectively.
11 Thus, such works 
are necessarily aesthetically flawed on even the Temporal Merit Principle. 
 Why stop with temporality? Why not think that the indexing of  a response to a standard is logical, 
say, rather than temporal? The answer is that in synchronic seductive works, appreciators must 
understand the first-order response’s unmeritedness while experiencing it in order to properly 
appreciate the work’s seductive point. So, separation of  that response and the repudiatory standard 
can only be temporal. Some non-seductive works invoke different standards simultaneously, and invite 
responses that appreciators are to consider relative to just some subset of  these standards. And some 
even place these responses in some kind of  tension, as when Picasso’s Guernica invites both horror at 
the war scene depicted and pleasure in the masterful use of  bold geometric forms. What distinguishes 
seductive artworks, however, is that the meritedness of  one response (second-order) cannot be cleaved 
from the meritedness of  the other (first-order). Even if  we assign each response its own standard, the 
second-order response cannot be understood without grasping how the first-order response falls short 
of  the standard aligned with the second-order response. 
                                            
11  I think a similar problem arises for non-synchronic seductive works that execute a gradual rather than sudden shift 
from one standard to another, such that during the shift, two different standards are operative. 
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  A different worry: why not treat synchronic and non-synchronic works separately as raising distinct 
paradoxes? I am not wedded to thinking that they form a natural kind among artworks. For some 
theoretic purpose, it may be better to firmly distinguish them. However, one ought also to recognize 
that they share a very important feature: their seductive form. Moreover, distinguishing them will not 
restore the plausibility of  a general, temporally nuanced Merit Principle. For, even if  such a principle 
explains why non-synchronic seductive works are not necessarily aesthetically flawed, combining it 
with synchronic works still leads to paradox. 
 
  3.5 The Ontological Proposal 
A different proposal in the same spirit as the last is that seductive artworks require a novel ontology. 
The discussion so far assumes seductive works invite two orders of  response. The proposal is that 
what I have called the first-order responses are part of  the seductive artwork itself. Thus, only what I 
have called the second-order responses are really responses that the seductive artwork invites. One 
can understand this roughly on the model of  a work that merely depicts an appreciator responding to 
an artwork. Just as a photo depicting someone’s response to an artwork does not thereby invite that 
response, so a seductive artwork does not invite the unmerited responses it “contains”. Thus it is not 
flawed in virtue of  the Merit Principle. It is natural to think of  many artworks as including appreciators 
or their attitudes. The installation piece 21 Balançoires by design studio Tous Les Jours, comprised a set 
of  swings installed in Montreal’s Quartier de Spectacles, each of  which played a set of  musical notes. 
The piece encouraged participants to cooperate by swinging in tandem, since this alone combined the 
sounds into pleasant melodies, as well as unlocking further melodic combinations. Christoph De 
Boeck’s Staalhemel includes 80 steel plates suspended parallel to the ceiling. It uses a single appreciator’s 
brain activity, detected via portable EEG, to cause small hammers to strike the steel plates while other 
appreciators look and listen on. Such participants might seem part of  these “interactive” works, rather 
than mere appreciators, not least because they form part of  what other appreciators not directly 
interacting with the work are invited to appreciate. Returning to seductive artworks, one might think 
that in responding as invited to their own attitudes, appreciators of, or their “first-order” attitudes 
toward, what I have been calling the “work” become part of  a larger meta-work. Thus, while containing 
the unmerited responses, seductive artworks only invite the “second order” merited repudiatory 
responses. To illustrate, the proposal is that the work, Man Bites Dog consists not merely of  a film, but 
of  a film plus the appreciator’s “first-order” amusement. The only responses Man Bites Dog invites are 
those of  guilt or shame towards that amusement, which are merited, leaving the work unblemished as 
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 regards the Merit Principle. Call this the “ontological proposal”. 
 If  tenable as an account of  interactive works, this proposal offers a promising escape from paradox 
perfectly suited to some seductive artworks. Brett Bailey’s Exhibit B, for instance, is an installation 
artwork depicting a fictional “human zoo” populated by actors racialized as Black.12 On one attractive 
interpretation, the work aims at inviting a racially loaded objectifying gaze in order to get the 
appreciator to recognize her susceptibility to executing such a gaze, in particular, by meeting eyes with 
the otherwise objectified actors. The piece’s exhibition at the Barbican in London was cancelled 
following protests about its ethical character—protests with which I am largely sympathetic. Protests 
notwithstanding, Exhibit B’s effectiveness lies not merely in making a spectacle of  the actors, but in 
making one of  the appreciators (predominantly racialized as White) as they execute their immoral 
gazes. As with 21 Balançoires and Staalhemel, the spectacle is one for both participants and third-party 
appreciators to behold. 
 Characterizing interactive works as “including the appreciator” is common but not inevitable. It is 
as plausible that interactive works do not include appreciators or their attitudes, even if  the interactions 
they enable do, much as Stevie Wonder’s Superstition is not located on the set of  Sesame Street in 1973, 
even if  a performance of  it is. The ontology of  interactive artworks is still nascent, currently offering 
only two well-developed accounts. On one, interactions with interactive works token a type, where the 
type constitutes the artwork (Lopes 2001). On the other, interactions do not token the work type, but 
a display type—a kind of  way that the work can be interacted with—where the work consists of  all 
of  its (possibly infinite) display types (Preston 2014). Notably, neither account includes appreciators 
or their attitudes among the artwork’s parts, though both include them in the interactions the artwork 
enables. That aside, even if  on the final analysis interactive works do contain appreciators or their 
attitudes, and even if  Exhibit B is among such works, it is dubious whether works such as Man Bites 
Dog are. If  nothing else, participants cannot substantively alter the contents of  these works or the 
appreciations they enable as they can with obviously interactive works. Thus, if  Exhibit B shows 
anything here, it is only that some seductive artworks are interactive, not all. 
 There is further reason to doubt the ontological proposal, even ignoring the interactivity issue. 
Namely, the proposal appeals to something too common among artworks to plausibly sustain it. Its 
guiding thought is that seductive artworks integrally concern, and invite appreciators to respond to, 
the appreciators’ own intentional attitudes, and that one should therefore include those attitudes in 
                                            
12  I thank Nathaniel Coleman and James McGuiggan for alerting me to this work. 
14
 the work itself. The problem is that works integrally concerning, and inviting appreciators to respond 
to, things seemingly outside a work, including appreciators’ attitudes, are all too common. Any work 
inviting its audience to reflect on the human condition will meet such a condition. But they do not 
thereby incorporate appreciators or their attitudes in the metaphysical sense the proposal requires—
not unless one embraces a radically revisionist ontology of  art in general. 
 
  3.6 The Seeming Proposal 
A final objection to (2) I will consider, in part because its analogue will reappear when I consider how 
to revise the Merit Principle, is that it mischaracterizes what seductive works do. While it is true that the 
second-order response a seductive work invites is only merited if  the first-order response it repudiates 
is not, a seductive work need not actually invite the first-order response, or so claims the proposal. It 
suffices for a seductive work to merely seem to invite an unmerited first-order response. Remembering 
that by invite a response x I intend attempt to elicit x, the proposal is that seductive works need only seem 
to attempt to elicit an unmerited first-order response. Since (2) claims that seductive works necessarily 
invite an unmerited response, this proposal amounts to a rejection of  (2), thus blocking the implication 
that such works need be aesthetically flawed. For, the Merit Principle is silent on the aesthetic effect of  
seeming to invite unmerited responses. Hence, no paradox. 
 Unfortunately, there are only two ways a work can seem to invite an unmerited response, neither 
of  which satisfactorily resolves the paradox. The first way is veridical: when what a work seems to do 
is what it in fact does. But clearly this is no help. If  seductive works seem to invite an unmerited 
response by in fact inviting an unmerited response, then the paradox remains. The second way is 
illusory: when a work merely seems to invite the response. The problem here is that it is implausible 
that seductive artworks do this. Seductive works do not merely seem to invite—i.e. attempt to elicit—
an unmerited first-order response; they do attempt to elicit such a response. For, without eliciting this 
response, the seductive strategy is doomed. Thus, neither way of  seeming to invite will help.13 
   
  
                                            
13  Berys Gaut adopts this proposal in (Gaut 2007). Given that the strategy is so transparently flawed, one might wonder 
why. The answer is that the strategy is more or less promising depending on what exactly one takes invitations to 
respond to consist in. My own view is that Gaut’s preference for ‘prescribes’ over ‘invites’ in his version of  the Merit 
Principle hides an ambiguity that makes the current proposal appear more promising than it is, and requires him to 
disambiguate along the lines I suggest at the very end. I return briefly to this point in a footnote at the end of  the 
paper. 
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  IV. Proposals: Rejecting Proposition (3) 
If  there are no more proposals for rejecting (2), the only remaining option for salvaging the Merit 
Principle is to reject (3). This amounts to gritting one’s teeth and accepting that artistically seductive 
works are necessarily flawed. How might one motivate this?  
 
  4.1 The Minor Flaws Proposal 
Seductive works, one might say, do indeed invite unmerited responses and are thereby aesthetically 
blemished. But as this small blemish makes the great achievement of  indicting the appreciators’ 
attitudes possible, it is obscured. The chief  problem with this suggestion is that it turns achievement 
into failure. Successful seductive works are so commendable not merely because they subvert our 
complacent responses, but because they do so by skillfully obscuring matters just enough to get 
appreciators to respond in an unmerited way, but not so much as to undermine the second-order 
response (i.e. by rendering the first-order response fully merited). This is a great achievement and 
ought to count as an aesthetic merit, not a blemish.  To insist that the first-order invitation must 
constitute a flaw is comparable to insisting that because some awful artworks are fascinating for how 
awful they are, then they must enjoy some aesthetic merit. It is to embrace implausibility in service of  
a prior philosophical principle. 
 
  4.2 Epistemic Privilege 
Still, one might insist that, while getting appreciators to respond in unmerited ways can be an 
achievement, letting that fact settle whether seductive works are flawed fails to take seriously how this 
tactic compromises the work. For instance, take an appreciator who has been a victim of  the kinds of  
crimes Man Bites Dog invites us to be amused by—violent burglary, say. Such an appreciator might be 
unable to appreciate Man Bites Dog at all, finding its initial invitation to amusement irredeemably 
tasteless. One temptation is to discount this appreciator’s experience as idiosyncratically hypersensitive. 
But another is to conclude that her experience grants her an epistemic privilege with respect to 
representations of  violent burglary. Her judgements are more, not less, authoritative. Those of  us 
without this experience are being glib when we deny that making light of  such heinous acts 
aesthetically blemishes the work.14 
 There is something to this suggestion, though more argument is needed. There is a question 
                                            
14  Thanks to Victor Kumar for pressing this objection. 
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 whether seductive works really make light of  the objects of  the first-order responses they invite. 
Another issue is how far the claim goes. If  a depiction of  domestic violence does not amuse a domestic 
violence victim, the claim that the depiction really is not amusing may be plausible.15 But where 
someone’s father, say, dies after being struck in the face by a pie, it is less plausible to think she enjoys 
some epistemic privilege with regard to which pie-gag responses are appropriate. Another 
complication is that where epistemic privilege lies is not always clear. Perhaps in general, privilege lies, 
if  anywhere, with the victims of  the represented offense, although this position leads to thorny 
questions about victimhood. To take one example, NWA’s Fuck the Police is both an expression of  
indignation at oppression by state power, and seemingly an uncompromising call to lethal violence 
against the police. Whose sensitivities should one privilege with respect to such a work—the oppressed 
person, or the victim of  anti-police violence?16 Perhaps both? In any case, accepting the suggestion 
only immunizes certain works against paradox. Some seductive works, perhaps including Man Bites 
Dog, might be aesthetically flawed for the ethical reasons just described. But there is no reason to think 
all seductive artworks are. Seductive works inviting responses that are ethically unmerited to only a 
minor degree, or for non-ethical reasons, such as the Boddington’s advertisement, do not plausibly fall 
within this category. 
 
* * * 
 
Since my several attempts to solve the paradox fail, I propose one ought to reject the Merit Principle 
after all, counter-intuitive though this seems. Aristotle claimed that successful tragedies exploit the 
unmerited misfortunes of  people like ourselves. It appears that sometimes, successful works exploit the 
unmerited responses of  people like ourselves.17 
 
 V. The Challenge of  Seductive Works 
I have shown how a live evaluative principle leads to paradox by implausibly implying that what I have 
called “seductive works” are necessarily aesthetically flawed. I tried undoing the paradox in ways that 
preserve the principle, but because each attempt failed, I rejected it. In this section, I consider why 
                                            
15  Again, for the sake of  simplicity, I am ignoring deeper questions about whether ethical considerations are relevant to 
aesthetic value. 
16  I am not suggesting these kinds of  violence are morally equivalent, just that both parties can be victims of  unjust 
violence. 
17 Thanks to Peter Railton for this keen observation. 
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 seductive works seem paradoxical and close with a revision that captures something of  the Merit 
Principle’s motivation while avoiding paradox. Whether the revision is ultimately defensible—in 
particular, whether it captures a specifically aesthetic failure—I leave to another occasion. 
 Ultimately, motivating the Merit Principle is an observation from actual artistic appreciation: works 
that do not move their audiences as intended fail on their own terms by failing to achieve their aims, 
and are to that extent aesthetically flawed. Note that this thought is couched in the causal terms of  
the Elicitation Principle, not the normative terms of  meritedness. Seductive artworks, like any other, are 
made for actual audiences whose fallibilities artists reckon with. They depend on appreciators’ 
capacities to be misled, to respond in ways they ought not to, and to recognize their mistake. When a 
seductive work secures both the first-order response and the second-order regret, it is to that extent 
successful. Abandoning the Elicitation Principle’s causal register for the normative register of  “merited 
responses” shrouds part of  a seduction strategy’s aesthetic achievement in mystery. 
 Putting this in terms of  a Humean ideal appreciator may clarify the problem. Suppose a response 
r to x is merited if  and only if  an ideal appreciator has response r to x. Then the Merit Principle’s 
problem is this: for seductive works to succeed, appreciators must be able to get things wrong. But 
Humean ideal appreciators are ones who always get things right. Therefore, just as our measure of  
aesthetic success cannot be determined (straightforwardly) by the responses of  such an ideal 
appreciator, nor can it be (straightforwardly) determined by whether the invited responses are merited. 
 To digress briefly, one may wonder if  appreciators really do have to get things wrong for seductive 
artworks to succeed. Inferring what is fictional in a work (that is, true at the work’s fictional world), 
for instance, typically proceeds non-monotonically: when a work of  fiction reveals new bits of  
information, it can thereby make p (seem) true in the fiction, when previously ~p had seemed true in 
it; a murder mystery might convince us of  the butler’s guilt before revealing that the vicar did it. 
Appreciators often draw conclusions from what would be very flimsy evidence at the actual word in 
a way warranted by the context of  engaging with an artwork (Walton 1990, 161-168). Could one not 
explain seductive artworks—at least non-synchronic ones—as exploiting this fact? And, if  so, would 
it not be right to say that both inferring that the butler did it, and that the vicar did it afterwards, are 
both merited given the evidence made available at the time? 
 The tone of  this suggestion should sound familiar from my discussion of  the “shifting standards” 
proposal. Still, it is worth considering insofar as it can help sharpen up one’s understanding of  
seductive artworks. I think the answer to the final question is a qualified ‘yes’ (I will get to the 
qualification shortly). For this reason, one should not think of  seductive artworks as executing an 
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 evidential shift as the murder mystery does. For a work to be truly seductive in my sense, it must give 
the appreciator just enough rope with which to hang herself, rather than—to strain the metaphor—
disguising the noose as a scarf. In order for the seductive work to have its distinctive effect, it must 
reveal to the appreciator how she falls short (in responding in an unmerited way), rather than that her 
epistemic position is deficient in ways for which the artwork is responsible. Compare this to a murder 
mystery that, for instance, exploits appreciators’ racial prejudices to induce the belief  that a butler 
conspicuously racialized as Black is guilty. To the extent that these prejudices prompt otherwise 
unmerited inferences, and the work exhibits all the other appropriate structural features, it counts as a 
seductive work.18 
 The qualification is that in one sense the belief  that the plain murder mystery’s butler is guilty is 
unmerited. Adopting the familiar distinction between subjective and objective norms of  justification, one 
can say that although subjectively merited (all available evidence suggests the butler’s guilt), the belief  
is objectively unmerited (it is false). Adopting these terms, I count as seductive only works exploiting 
subjectively unmerited response to execute the seductive strategy. But the distinction raises interesting 
questions: (1) Does the Merit Principle concern subjectively and objectively unmerited responses or just 
the former? (2) is a repudiatory second-order response toward a merely objectively unmerited first-order 
response ever merited, whether subjectively or objectively? Would regret, for instance, be merited 
towards having falsely believed that the plain murder mystery’s butler “dunit”? To the first question I 
answer that the Merit Principle is more plausibly read as the weaker claim concerning only subjectively 
unmerited responses. Indeed, because of  works like the plain murder mystery, the stronger claim is 
much more obviously implausible. To the second, I answer that there may be cases where a repudiatory 
response toward a merely objectively unmerited response is merited; if  so, the class of  seductive 
artworks will be larger than I have taken it to be. I will not argue for either answer except to note that 
(a) it is far more contentious whether regret, shame, embarrassment, etc. about a merely objectively 
unmerited response are ever thereby merited, and (b) settling either question does not alter the force 
of  my preceding arguments; there is still a class of  seductive artworks inviting subjectively unmerited 
first-order responses which, combined with the Merit Principle, generates a paradox. This is true even 
on the Merit Principle’s more plausible weaker reading, as concerning only subjectively unmerited 
responses. 
                                            
18  I think the examples I discuss are examples of  seductive artworks understood in this way. But suppose one doubted 
this. Would the paradox go away? No. As long as the conceptual possibility of  such a work exists, the problem arises—
even if, as a matter of  contingent fact, no such work exists. 
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  Returning to the original thread, there is a more sophisticated and plausible response-dependent 
theory that appeals to ideal critics than the one considered above. It is one that appeals to a broader 
class of  responses, especially judgements, as determining or at least indicating the properties a work 
has. It is more plausible because, while an ideal critic may not respond as a work invites her to, she 
may still judge the work to be such as to elicit the invited response from intended audiences, just as 
adults can often judge that a children’s book is funny (to children) without being themselves amused. 
Appealing to this broader repertoire of  responses closes the gap between a causal and a normative 
standard by making ideal critics sensitive to the responses that would be caused in intended 
appreciators. It thereby seemingly combines the normative benefits of  the Merit Principle with the 
causal benefits of  the Elicitation Principle in a hybrid standard. Moreover, this position appears to be 
Hume’s own: 
 
But to enable a critic the more fully to execute this undertaking, he must preserve his mind free 
from all prejudice, and allow nothing to enter into his consideration, but the very object which is 
submitted to his examination. We may observe, that every work of  art, in order to produce its due 
effect on the mind, must be surveyed in a certain point of  view, and cannot be fully relished by 
persons, whose situation, real or imaginary, is not conformable to that which is required by the 
performance. An orator addresses himself  to a particular audience, and must have a regard to their 
particular genius, interests, opinions, passions, and prejudices; otherwise he hopes in vain to govern 
their resolutions, and inflame their affections. […] A critic of  a different age or nation, who should 
peruse this discourse, must have all these circumstances in his eye, and must place himself  in the 
same situation as the audience, in order to form a true judgment. (Hume 1757a, 224-225) 
 
Ironically, Hume’s stipulation that an ideal critic be “cleared of  all prejudice” (229) requires her to 
adopt, in some sense, some of  the prejudices of  the work’s intended audience. 
 This new standard runs into a difficulty, however. The problem with a wholly normative standard 
is that it does not allow for the faultless exploitation of  error that seductive artworks require; such 
ideal critics do not commit errors. The problem with a wholly causal standard is that while it, as it 
were, allows for error, it allows too much, since even the worst invitations might cause deficient 
appreciators to respond as invited, which by itself  tells us nothing about a work’s aesthetic value. The 
problem with the hybrid standard, meanwhile, is that it runs into the problem of  trivially flawless 
works. Some art panders to humanity’s most asinine dispositions. But if  one characterizes the relevant 
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 audience as explicitly asinine, such that asininity is one of  the “prejudices” an ideal critic will have to 
embody to accurately evaluate the work, then these invitations will be aesthetically faultless. But 
presumably one wants to rule out such immunity to aesthetic failure. At least it should be possible for 
invitations that rely on wholly unwarranted attitudes for their success to count against a work’s 
aesthetic value, especially when the invited responses are not ultimately disavowed. Assuming for the 
sake of  an example that ethical flaws can ground aesthetic ones, it is no good defending Birth of  a 
Nation against aesthetic criticism because it was intended for White supremacists. The problem then 
is that while the hybrid standard can explain how seductive artworks need not be aesthetically flawed 
for inviting an unmerited response, it does so too easily; it fails to explain how many cases in which 
an unmerited response is invited does blemish the work. 
 Causal principles of  the kind we are after are too weak; they fail to mark some flaws as flaws. 
Moreover, their total lack of  normative constraint makes them unworkable. If  one is to find a credible 
principle, therefore, it will have to be captured in normative terms.  But the fully normative principles 
I have discussed are too strong; they mark as flaws things that are not. I believe the problem arises 
from the focus on attempts to elicit—invitations. As seductive artworks show, merely attempting to 
elicit a response does not commit the artwork to the response; the response can be disavowed. And it 
is through this possibility of  disavowal that seductive artworks can successfully exploit unmerited 
responses. Therefore, something stronger than invitation is needed. I think a more promising principle 
emerges once one couches matters in terms of  a work’s endorsing rather than merely inviting responses. 
For, endorsement cannot be disavowed in the same way. In the next section I consider just such a 
principle. 
 
 
VI. A Solution? 
Here is a suggested revision to the Merit Principle that avoids the paradox I have described. If  instead 
of  attempts to elicit an unmerited response, the principle focusses on attempts to make such a response 
merited, a solution presents itself. That is, if  one moves from… 
 
MERIT PRINCIPLE 
A work that attempts to elicit an unmerited response in appreciators through artistic means is to that 
extent aesthetically flawed. 
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 To… 
 
REVISED MERIT PRINCIPLE 
A work that attempts to make merited an unmerited response in appreciators through artistic means is 
to that extent aesthetically flawed. 
 
One can avoid the paradox, specifically, by applying the analogue of  the “seeming proposal” outlined 
in §3.6. While seductive works clearly do not merely seem to attempt to elicit an unmerited response, 
they do merely seem to attempt to make such a response merited. Seductive artworks acknowledge 
and exploit the unmeritedness in the first-order responses they attempt to elicit; it therefore makes 
little sense to think that such works try to make these responses merited, even if  they seem to do so. 
What exactly does it mean to say that a work “attempts to make a response merited”? I intend this 
cumbersome phrase to express the endorsing of a response. I retain the phrase only because it more 
explicitly shows the revision’s relation to the original principle. Recall that the Merit Principle tries to 
capture one way a work can fail on its own terms. The Revised Merit Principle would show exactly how 
a work does so—by literally attempting to make the unmerited merited, even if  not under that 
description. 
 The revision avoids paradox. But does it capture a specifically aesthetic failure? Is it tenable? For, 
while it is plausible that a work’s attempting to make an unmerited response merited is thereby flawed, 
it is less clear it must be aesthetically flawed specifically. I will not take up this question here, except to 
note that the Revised Merit Principle seems no worse off  than its original counterpart in one important 
respect. Namely, I suspect that a failure—whether to elicit or make merited—can only be aesthetic 
when the response is itself  “aesthetic”. If  a work attempts but fails to elicit (as per the original 
principle) or to make merited (as per the revision) a response concerning its financial value, for 
example, then this may not be a specifically aesthetic failure.19 Known forgeries, for instance, plausibly 
fail in attempting to elicit and make merited responses concerning their financial value; but these 
failures seem orthogonal to their aesthetic success. If  a work attempts to elicit or make merited an 
unmerited response concerning the work’s gracefulness, however, then this may plausibly be an 
aesthetic failure (at least when the work is not a seductive work in the case of  attempting to elicit).20 
                                            
19  A similar point is made in (Stecker 2005, 145-146). 
20  I do think there are reasons to be skeptical that a work’s endorsing an unmerited response renders it aesthetically 
flawed, though I do not discuss them here. If  they are overriding, this raises an interesting worry about Berys Gaut’s 
ethicism, which is premised on a version of  the Merit Principle put in terms of  prescribing unmerited responses, rather 
22
  If  my suspicion is right (though I have said little to support it), then both principles would need 
clarification to avoid counterexamples, such as works that attempt to elicit or make merited unmerited 
responses concerning their financial value. As we saw in §3.1, for all the counterexamples, there will 
still be some considerations (e.g. beauty) that bear upon the meritedness of  responses (e.g. judgements 
of  beauty) that are obviously aesthetically relevant and that seductive works can exploit (e.g. by 
attempting to elicit judgements of  beauty beyond what is merited). Thus, if  my suspicion is correct, 
clarifying the principles would have to consist in restricting ‘responses’ to aesthetic responses, leaving 
us with a slightly more scope-restricted version of  the same paradox in the case of  the Merit Principle. 
With all that in mind, the Revised Merit Principle, suitably restricted, would capture something important 
about the original Merit Principle while avoiding paradox. Determining its truth-value must wait for 
another time. 
                                            
than inviting them. Gaut’s “prescribe” is ambiguous between ‘invite’ and ‘endorse’ in a way that may undermine his 
“Merited Response Argument” for ethicism, which tries to tie the aesthetic failing of  prescribing an unmerited response 
to the ethical failing of  doing so. For, if  the aesthetic failing consists in inviting the unmerited response, and the ethical 
failing consists in endorsing it, then the apparent logical connection between the two failures depends upon the 
equivocal ‘prescribe’. I develop this argument elsewhere. 
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Chapter Two 
Imaginative and Fictionality Failure: a Normative Approach† 
 
 I. Introduction: Two Puzzles 
In Goethe’s Faust it is true in the fiction—or fictional21—that the Devil makes a bet with God and 
transforms into a poodle. Readers have no trouble imagining this state of  affairs. Generally, we 
cooperate imaginatively with written fictions, and what their authors22 describe as being the case in 
their stories becomes fictional. But suppose you encounter the following line in a novel: 
 
Giselda 
In killing her baby, Giselda did the right thing; after all, it was a girl. (Walton 1994, p. 37). 
 
Or consider the following story: 
 
Death 
Jack and Jill were arguing again. This was not in itself  unusual, but this time they were standing in 
the fast lane of  I-95 having their argument. This was causing traffic to bank up a bit. It wasn’t 
                                            
†  My thanks to those who have helped with this paper in its various incarnations: Brian Weatherson, Ken Walton, Margot 
Strohminger, Jonathan Payne, Sarah Moss, Derek Matravers, Sam Liao, Dan Jacobson, Rob Hopkins, Danny Herwitz, 
Dom Gregory, Gregg Crane, Sarah Buss, Aili Bresnahan, Paloma Atencia Linares, two anonymous referees, and the 
editorial team at Philosophers' Imprint. Thanks also to audiences at the University of  Sheffield’s Postgraduate Seminar 
(2009), the University of  Michigan (2014), Michigan’s Aesthetics Discussion Group (2010), and the annual meetings 
of  the British Society of  Aesthetics (2014), the American Society for Aesthetics (2014), and the American Philosophical 
Association (2014). Finally, thanks to the UK and US public, whose investment in research made the paper possible; 
long may that investment continue. 
21  What does it mean for p to be “fictional”? I follow the most influential theory of  fiction in aesthetics outlined in 
Kendall Walton’s (1990), according to which, for p to be fictional in a work w means, roughly, that p is to be imagined 
by appreciators of  w, and that when such appreciators state ‘p’, ordinarily (a) they express a proposition with the logical 
syntax, ‘fictionally, p’; and (b) fictionally, they say something true. For more details of  this view, see Walton (1990) and 
(2015). For a quick (though imperfect) gloss of  how the theory works, see (Stear, 2009, pp. 24-28). 
22 I will mostly ignore narratological subtleties as to whether we should understand this authorship as actual or implied. 
For those interested, (Booth 1961) and (Nehamas 1981) offer classic accounts of  “implied”, or “postulated” 
authorship. 
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 significantly worse than normally happened around Providence, not that you could have told that 
from the reactions of  passing motorists. They were convinced that Jack and Jill, and not the 
volume of  traffic, were the primary causes of  the slowdown. They all forgot how bad traffic 
normally is along there. When Craig saw that the cause of  the bankup (sic) had been Jack and Jill, 
he took his gun out of  the glovebox and shot them. People then started driving over their bodies, 
and while the new speed hump caused some people to slow down a bit, mostly traffic returned to 
its normal speed. So Craig did the right thing, because Jack and Jill should have taken their 
argument somewhere else where they wouldn’t get in anyone’s way. (Weatherson 2004, p. 1) 
 
Passages like these, which I will call “puzzle cases”, are widely thought to give rise to two failures. 
First, appreciators fail to imagine a proposition they express. Call this phenomenon imaginative failure. 
Second, they fail to make a proposition they express fictional; it is not true in the stories that Giselda 
or Craig did the right thing. Call this fictionality failure. These phenomena give rise to two corresponding 
puzzles:23 
 
The Imaginative Puzzle 
Why do puzzle cases induce imaginative failure? 
 
The Fictionality Puzzle24 
Why do puzzle cases induce fictionality failure? 
 
To generate these puzzles, it is not enough that a text include some proposition p resulting in 
something like our two failures. After all, a work may express p intradiegetically—in the voice of  an 
unreliable narrator or a character, for instance. Alternatively, a work may express p non-assertorically—
ironically, perhaps. Nor does temporarily stumping a reader suffice. Many fictions deliberately puzzle 
                                            
23 Kendall Walton first noticed these puzzles (Walton 1990, pp.154-155), though he credits Hume with observing 
something similar (Hume 1757/2007, p.253). Twenty-five years on, a lively literature has emerged that occasionally 
bundles the two phenomena together as “imaginative resistance”, a name introduced by Richard Moran (1994, p. 95), 
becoming the official Kunstbegriff with (Gendler 2000). The catch-all name is unfortunate, since while both phenomena 
may share an explanation—indeed, I will argue they do—we should not presume this. Moreover, as others have noted, 
to characterize imaginative failure as “resistance” is tendentious, since whether it results from unwillingness or inability 
(or anything else) is disputed. Finally, the name suggests both phenomena implicate the imagination, which fictionality 
failure need not. 
24 This is the same as Brian Weatherson’s “alethic puzzle”, unless we take the potential scope of  the puzzle to extend 
beyond fiction and include (literary) representations generally—see (Weatherson 2004), (Matravers 2014). 
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 readers in order to induce “hermeneutic recalibration”, whereby appreciators resolve their difficulty 
by settling on a new stable interpretation (Liao 2011, pp. 27, 27n., 98-99), (Liao 2013, pp. 7-8). Puzzle 
cases, therefore, are those in which on the best interpretation(s) a work attempts to prescribe p by 
expressing it explicitly, but appreciators fail to imagine p and/or p fails to be fictional, where these 
failures persist through proper and complete appreciation of  the work. Such cases may become 
conspicuous by simply stumping a reader permanently. Alternatively, they may do so by forcing readers 
into an unstable interpretative strategy, as when the previously effaced narrator seems to become an 
unreliable one, moving from extradiegetic to intradiegetic narration.25 
 Recently some have denied that the phenomena are puzzling.26 I begin in §2, therefore, by 
explicating and criticizing the most sophisticated defence of  this denial. In §3, I switch gears and 
examine the best extant attempt to solve the puzzles, showing where it falls short. In §4, I propose an 
alternative solution, tease out some subtleties not given their due in the existing literature, and motivate 
the proposal by showing how it avoids a tricky objection that superficially similar proposals do not. 
 I should note before proceeding that I am sympathetic to much of  what the authors I go on to 
criticize have written. My arguments owe a great debt to theirs. 
 
 II. Is there a Genuine Puzzle? 
In (Todd 2009), Cain Todd argues that puzzle cases are not genuinely puzzling as follows: 
 
Imaginative failure is real, but not genuinely puzzling (p. 188). 
(from 1) If  there is a genuinely puzzling phenomenon among the two described, it is fictionality 
failure. 
Our only reason for positing fictionality failure is by inferring it from cases of  imaginative failure 
(enthymeme). 
We are not warranted in inferring fictionality failure from cases of  imaginative failure (pp. 199-
203). 
(from 3, 4) There is no fictionality failure. 
(from 2, 5) There is no genuinely puzzling phenomenon. 
 
                                            
25 A phenomenon sometimes referred to as “pop-out”, following (Gendler 2006). 
26 See, for instance, (Stokes 2006, pp. 402-405), (Millgram, unpublished manuscript), and (Todd 2009), whose paper I 
discuss here at length. (Nanay 2010, p. 587) is also a candidate. A name has even emerged for this denial: imaginative 
resistance eliminativism (Liao & Gendler forthcoming). 
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 (1) and (4) are the controversial claims Todd must defend.27 Todd supports (1) by arguing that 
imaginative failure results from appreciators’ differing theoretical commitments. He supports (4) by 
arguing that what we are able to imagine does not constrain what can be fictional. I lay out these 
arguments now after introducing what I call “qualifying contexts”. 
 
  2.1 Reinstating the Imaginative Puzzle 
Interestingly, authors can avoid puzzle cases by supplying contexts that vindicate the otherwise 
problematic claim. Suppose Giselda continued in the following way: 
 
Giselda* 
In killing her baby, Giselda did the right thing; after all, it was a girl. Since the Patriarchy Party had 
seized power, all girls faced horrific lives of  state-sponsored sexual slavery. Giselda felt nauseous 
killing her child; doing what’s right isn’t always easy. 
 
I take it that any imaginative difficulty Giselda induces, Giselda* does not. We have no trouble imagining 
Giselda’s actions are right, albeit awful, in Giselda*. Addressing herself  to the imaginative puzzle, 
Kathleen Stock makes just this point. Shy of  conceptual impossibilities, she says, authors can render 
any claim imaginable using a qualifying context (Stock 2005).28 In fact, her claim is stronger; not only 
may authors write in qualifying contexts, but readers may supply them in imagination. This suggests a 
natural solution to the imaginative puzzle: imaginative failure results from a reader’s contingent failure 
to think up a qualifying context (Stock 2005, pp. 619-620). 
 A conclusion Todd draws from Stock’s discussion is that, if  she is right, imaginative failure “is not 
as puzzling with respect to authorial authority as first thought” (Todd 2009, p. 192). One way to 
understand this is as follows. Initially, we thought puzzle cases denied authors the power to make 
certain claims fictional. However, if  authors need only add qualifying contexts to remedy such cases, 
they are hardly impotent; nothing prevents them from doing so. Indeed, if  per Stock’s stronger claim 
the imaginer’s inadequacy causes imaginative failure, authorial authority remains untouched. The author 
is no more impotent before our feeble imaginations than a musician is before a deaf  audience. 
 Todd is skeptical that things are so straightforward, and denies that we can supply qualifying 
                                            
27 Is (3) not controversial, too? Not if  we take it as merely restricting the scope of  inquiry to puzzle cases, rather than 
ruling out other possible reasons for inferring fictionality failure.  
28 Gendler acknowledges similar mechanisms for causing puzzlement to “evaporate” in her discussion of  distorting and 
non-distorting fictions (Gendler 2000, pp. 75-81). 
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 contexts for any puzzle case and any imaginer. Some puzzle cases, he thinks, will consist in attempted 
prescriptions to imagine that contradict exceptionless theoretical commitments, such as an 
appreciator’s conceptual commitments, particularly involving thicker moral concepts subject to strong 
descriptive and evaluative conditions.29 Todd’s idea here is straightforward. Objects and events fall 
under concepts. Deliberately killing someone against her will (and not in self-defence), for instance, 
falls under the concept murder. Now suppose Persons A and B differ as follows: for A, murder is an 
essentially negatively valenced thick concept (unlike euthanasia, say), while it is not for B. A will deem 
a “good murder” conceptually incoherent; no context could render a murder good as such. For B, 
meanwhile, good murders (perhaps where victims are superlatively nasty) are a coherent possibility 
and pose no problem—at least, no conceptual problem. Therefore, a story describing a murder as good, 
even within a qualifying context C, will induce imaginative failure in A but not B. Put differently, C will 
count as a qualifying context for B but not A. Todd thinks this holds generally. People with less flexible 
theoretical commitments will be more prone to experiencing imaginative failure.30 
 Put puzzle cases involving inflexible theoretical commitments to one side for now. Todd accepts 
that the possibility of  qualifying contexts dissolves the imaginative puzzle. According to Stock, either 
authors or appreciators can supply a qualifying context, the former by writing it into the story, the 
latter by imagining it. However, that authors can supply qualifying contexts, useful though this insight 
is, does not satisfactorily dissolve the imaginative puzzle. The imaginative puzzle asks why we cannot 
imagine some proposition(s) a work attempts to prescribe, particularly since authors get us to imagine 
myriad claims, even bizarre ones, without relying upon any special context. Pointing out that 
imaginative failure vanishes from puzzle cases supplemented by qualifying contexts, therefore, side-
steps the issue. Why some cases but not others require a qualifying context looks like a puzzle as 
difficult as the one with which we started.31 And the claim that appreciators may supply their own 
                                            
29 Todd does not focus only on conceptual commitments—see (Todd 2009, p. 196). The arguments I go on to make 
cover the other commitments he considers as well. 
30 Todd appears to think his view a departure from Stock’s. If  so, this is a mistake. As mentioned—indeed, as Todd 
himself  notes (p. 192)—Stock does not take her solution to cover cases of  conceptual impossibility (Stock 2005, p. 
623). And since, as he also notes, the kind of  failure he describes constitutes a kind of  failure-by-conceptual-
impossibility (Todd 2009, p. 196), it meshes nicely with the ambitions of  Stock’s solution. Todd’s discussion of  
imaginer-relative conceptual dependencies echoes earlier ones in (Walton 1994) and  (Weatherson 2004, p. 21) 
31 Todd might seem to acknowledge a similar point, citing Gendler’s claim that “the issue is why making some sorts of  
propositions imaginable takes a different kind of  effort than making other sorts of  propositions imaginable” (Gendler 
2006, p. 158n), (Todd 2009, p. 193). However, I take Todd (and Gendler) here to be stressing the difficulty with which 
we imagine puzzle cases in order to then motivate their ideas about what affects imaginability (in Todd’s case, the effect 
of  theoretical commitments; in Gendler’s, the effect of  ethical commitments). My point is not that puzzle cases are 
still puzzling because difficult to imagine, or that Stock misses this point (she does not). Rather, my point is that puzzle 
cases still pose a puzzle if, unlike non-puzzle cases, they require authorial intervention to render them unpuzzling. 
29
 qualifying contexts, at least in puzzle cases falling short of  conceptual incoherence, is untenable. 
According to Stock, when Giselda induces imaginative failure in us, this is because we are unable to 
think up what could possibly make Giselda’s act of  female infanticide right. But, on reflection, this is 
not terribly plausible. All but the most imaginatively stunted will be able to generate a qualifying 
context for cases like Giselda. One need simply imagine something worse that would occur were 
Giselda to refrain from infanticide (indeed, this is what Giselda* prescribes).32 One might object that 
thinking up qualifying contexts seems simpler than it is because I am drawing on years of  philosophical 
practice. Philosophers are trained in many comparable imaginative tasks, such as finding 
counterexamples, constructing thought experiments, and reasoning counterfactually about normative 
matters. But non-philosophers may not find it so straightforward. Here I need only point out that 
imaginative failure is the brainchild of  professional philosophers who experience it themselves. Were 
imagining a qualifying context all one needed to undo the failure, it would be mysterious why 
philosophers discuss puzzle cases at all. 
 In fact, Stock’s suggestion seems appropriate for close cousins of  puzzle cases, namely riddles. 
Consider this old chestnut: 
 
A father and his son are in a car accident. The father dies instantly. The son, badly injured, is 
rushed to the nearest hospital. At the hospital, the surgeon enters the room and exclaims “I can’t 
operate on this boy.”  
“Why not?” the nurse asks.  
“Because he’s my son”, the surgeon responds. 
How can this be? 
 
The riddle exploits pervasive gender associations embedded in our social schemata—in this case, 
maleness in our surgeon schema. The solution is that the surgeon is the boy’s mother, and upon 
realizing this, any mystery evaporates, never to return. Puzzle cases are different. After reading Giselda*, 
I am not relieved of  any imaginative failure when returning to read the original, Giselda.33 Yet this is 
what Stock’s solution predicts. Although after reading Giselda* I now have a qualifying context in hand, 
Giselda still induces imaginative failure in me. Were Stock’s solution right, this would not be the case. 
                                            
32 Sethe, the protagonist of  Toni Morrison’s novel Beloved, finds herself  in a situation analogous to Giselda’s in which she 
kills her two-year-old daughter to save her from slavers. Many puzzled by cases like Giselda will already be familiar with 
Morrison’s story and would have it to draw upon. I thank an anonymous referee for reminding me of  this work. 
33 I am simplifying matters a little here. I address complexities later in the paper. 
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  How about the claim that imaginative failure is induced by an appreciator’s inflexible theoretical 
commitments? Todd writes, 
 
If  one holds that certain, or even all, general moral principles are unconditionally and necessarily 
true, such that nothing could legitimate claims like ‘murder is good’, then perhaps one will be 
unable to imagine or will more readily resist imagining that murder qua murder could ever be good 
or justified. […] If, however, one holds certain expressivist positions, or is a subjectivist, or a 
relativist about moral truth, then there seems to be no reason why one should not find it possible 
to imagine a world or a context in which it is true that murder is good or can be good. (Todd 2009, 
p. 196) 
 
The suggestion that imaginative failure is probably more likely for people with realist meta-ethical 
views is odd, since there is a difference between the normative (and modal) content of  moral claims 
and their cognitive or metaphysical status; only the former seems relevant to the kinds of  cases Todd 
considers. Meta-ethical relativism may be the exception insofar as we take it (perhaps wrongly) to entail 
a constraint for normative ethics: that purely moral facts differ in different places.34 In any case, the 
implication is that without such inflexible commitments, one will not experience imaginative failure to 
begin with (ignoring the improbable case where one cannot think up a qualifying context). But this 
thought leads to difficulty, since we do experience imaginative failure in cases like Giselda, regardless of  
the flexibility of  our theoretical convictions. To see this, consider someone who experiences no 
imaginative failure when reading Giselda*; probably, you are such a person. It follows from the claim 
under consideration that this person cannot have any relevant inflexible commitments—i.e. such a 
person must think female infanticide acceptable in some cases. But this person may still experience 
imaginative failure when reading Giselda. Thus, whatever is causing her to suffer imaginative failure, it 
cannot be the inflexibility of  her theoretical commitments; it must be something else (even if  in 
addition to this ‘something else’, an appreciator’s inflexible commitments can overdetermine 
imaginative failure in other cases). The claims that imaginative failure will not occur if  appreciators 
think up a qualifying context, or that otherwise it must be due to the inflexibility of  an appreciator’s 
theoretical commitments, are untenable, leaving us with a puzzle: whence imaginative failure?35 
                                            
34 In fairness, Todd acknowledges that an expressivist with firm moral convictions may be as prone to imaginative failure 
as a realist with looser moral convictions. However, I fail to see how meta-ethical commitments bear any relevance to 
moral cases of  imaginative failure such as Giselda. 
35 Could Todd not just attribute imaginative failure to a more comprehensive inflexible theoretical commitment—e.g. a 
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  2.2 Reinstating the Fictionality Puzzle 
People experience imaginative failure. And premise 3 in the argument above tells us that fictionality 
failure may only be legitimately inferred from imaginative failure, if  at all. Therefore, to deny that there 
is a fictionality puzzle, one must show that imaginative failure never licences an inference to fictionality 
failure. Todd offers three arguments to this effect. 
 The first argument is that limiting what is fictional by what appreciators are able to imagine “seems 
to deny authors the very power that makes fiction possible in the first place”. He continues: 
 
One who refused to read a work of  fiction because it violates all sorts of  metaphysical, logical and 
conceptual ‘truths’ which one could not fully imagine would manifest at the very least a very odd 
attitude to fiction. Refusing to allow that a work can make it fictional that the pig in the restaurant 
at the end of  the universe tries to persuade the guests in perfect English that he desires to be eaten 
would be an indictment of  the reader’s view of  fiction, not of  the fiction itself. (Todd 2009, p. 
199) 
 
Todd’s argument is a simple reductio: imaginative failure is imaginer-relative; therefore, if  one can 
legitimately infer fictionality failure from imaginative failure, then fictionality failure is also imaginer-
relative; but if  what is fictional is relative to different imaginers, then authorial authority fails; but 
authorial authority cannot fail; therefore, one cannot legitimately infer fictionality failure from 
imaginative failure. This conclusion is then used to establish Todd’s ultimate claim that there is no 
puzzle. 
 For clarity, let us call the failure of  authorial authority ‘authorial failure’. And since fictionality 
failure just is the failure of  a work, and thus its author, to make something fictional despite explicitly 
attempting to prescribe it, for the purposes of  discussing Todd’s argument, authorial failure and 
fictionality failure come to the same thing. But now the argument clearly begs the question. For, it says 
that we cannot infer fictionality failure from imaginative failure because this would mean that there 
was authorial failure, which cannot occur. But since authorial failure just is fictionality failure, this 
amounts to saying that because authorial authority cannot fail, authorial authority cannot fail. 
                                            
commitment to the wrongness of  female-infanticide-in-ordinary-circumstances rather than female-infanticide-
simpliciter? Yes. But then we are owed an explanation as to why appreciators do not just import non-ordinary 
circumstances—i.e. a qualifying context—to accommodate the author’s otherwise puzzling judgement. My own 
explanation in §4 does this. Thanks to Sam Liao for this worry. 
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  Todd’s second argument is that an appreciator’s imaginative capacities might fall short of  the 
author’s powers of  fiction-making. For instance, consider a story in which a super-villain, Dr. 
Quantum occupies two distant places at once by exploiting quantum super-positions. Amilie, 
unfamiliar with quantum mechanics, might fail to imagine the proposition because she fails to 
understand how something could in any sense occupy two distant places at once. Yet Amilie’s 
imaginative inability does not undermine that fictionally, Dr. Quantum does just that. The point is 
compelling. Fictionality failure certainly does not follow from imaginative shortcomings of  this sort. 
And so one can grant the general point that imaginative failure, understood very broadly, does not 
imply fictionality failure. However, it is not clear that this undermines the inference from imaginative 
to fictionality failure in all cases—that is, from certain kinds of  imaginative failure. It is of  course true 
that one should not require that all appreciators be able to successfully imagine p in order for p to 
count as fictional, since appreciators can be deficient, as our example shows. One should not 
determine what is fictional on the evidence of  such appreciators any more than one should determine 
a painting’s quality by the judgements of  the colour-blind. Amilie’s failure to imagine does not licence 
an inference to what is fictional because the deficiency is so clearly with Amilie and not the work. 
However, when imaginative failure still occurs systematically across a set of  sufficiently proper cases 
of  appreciation, i.e. where no explanation in terms of  the deficient conditions of  appreciation is 
forthcoming, we have perfectly reasonable grounds for inferring fictionality failure.36 
 A different difficulty arises from Kendall Walton’s point that the fictionality of  some proposition 
p is neither necessary nor sufficient for imagining that p. It is not sufficient, since one may recognize 
that p is fictional without imagining it. Nor is it necessary; one may engage in fanciful imaginings not 
authorized by a work (Walton 2008, p. 51). I might imagine, for instance, that James Bond experiences 
crippling erectile dysfunction without it being fictional in the work that he does. These kinds of  cases 
also clearly fall short of  proper engagement and so can be dealt with as above. However, Walton also 
claims that not only what is fictional and what we do imagine can come apart, but that it is possible for 
a proposition to be fictional even if  we are unable to imagine it. This poses a different difficulty for the 
rebuttal I just made to Todd, for Walton intends this claim not for deficient cases of  appreciation, like 
Amilie’s, but for appreciation in general. It might also seem a strange claim for Walton to make since 
on his theory p’s being fictional in w is true just in case appreciators of  w ought to imagine p. And, put 
                                            
36 Hence, my appeals to what “we” can imagine, and “our” responses should be read with a sufficient degree of  
idealization in mind (except where this is obviously not my intention). I will not delve into aesthetic idealization per se 
since this would take us too far afield, though I discuss aspects of  it at the end of  the paper. 
33
 together, these two claims appear to be inconsistent with the principle of  ought implies can (Walton 2008, 
p. 56).37 Walton gets around this by pointing out that the ‘ought’ here is conditional: we ought to 
imagine p if  we are to “fully appreciate” w. But we may simply be unable to fully appreciate w. 
 Walton is here mooting the possibility of  a work that systematically induces imaginative failure 
across non-deficient appreciations, but without inducing fictionality failure. Call this an 
“unimaginable-yet-fictional” work. As it stands, it is merely a theoretical possibility, though I have no 
overriding reason to rule it out. Suppose such a work existed. We might find it especially valuable; 
many artworks exploit contingent “weaknesses” in our psychology to great effect; trompe l’œil paintings 
are one example, Leonardo Da Vinci’s use of  sfumato in La Bella Principessa and, more famously, Mona 
Lisa to create an ambiguous smile is another.38 Unimaginable-yet-fictional works might be another. 
Would such a work contradict my claim that cases inducing imaginative failure systematically across 
proper appreciations give us good grounds to think they also exhibit fictionality failure?  I do not think 
so. One ought to be a pluralist about failures to imagine what a work prescribes, or merely attempts 
to. Some cases of  imaginative failure are explained by the deficiency of  the appreciator, some by the 
deficiency of  the conditions under which she appreciates, and some, if  unimaginable-yet-fictional 
works are possible, by systematic deficiencies across appreciators, however ideal. But, in addition, there 
will be cases where what explains imaginative failure is not plausibly a deficiency in appreciation. And 
thus, must be explained by the work. On these occasions, imaginative failure gives one at least 
defeasible grounds on which to infer fictionality failure. Puzzle cases such as Giselda and Death present 
just such occasions. And provided the reasons why these puzzle cases exhibit fictionality failure are not 
obvious, we have the fictionality puzzle. 
 
  2.3 Normative, not Psychological Puzzles 
In the previous subsections, I have tried to not only show that there are interesting puzzles here, but 
to use Todd’s observations to motivate a new way of  thinking about them and how they connect. In 
particular, by eliminating cases of  imaginative failure for which appreciators evidently bear sole 
responsibility, we are left with cases for which a different kind of  explanation is due. Of  course, one 
might worry that restricting one’s attention in this way misses the point. We have two puzzles; one 
concerns the imagination, the other concerns fictional truth. Insofar as one is concerned with the first 
                                            
37 In the interest of  space, I am ignoring here the problems raised in (Walton 2015) concerning propositions we are 
prescribed to imagine that are not fictional.  
38 For recent empirical work into the technique and how it works, see (Soranzo & Newberry 2015).  
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 puzzle, one might think, surely one ought not restrict one’s attention. After all, do we not want to 
capture and explain regular appreciators and the failures they experience? I agree we do, provided we 
understand the problem to be explained here as purely psychological. But notice that, approached in 
this way, Amilie’s failure to imagine what happens in Dr. Quantum is just as (un)puzzling as, say, a 
Kantian’s failure to imagine a morally right murder. Both demand an equally simple explanation—i.e. 
very simple; this, I take it, is precisely Todd’s point when he denies that imaginative failure is puzzling. 
So, in one sense Todd is right about imaginative failure. Provided we look at such a failure in terms of  
the imagination in general, as a psychological capacity whose engagement with any particular work is 
incidental, there will be little to puzzle over.39 At least, any remaining puzzle will not be our original 
one. In contrast, if  we construe imaginative failure as premised on engaging with a work of  fiction, a 
different problem space emerges. Construed this way, each case of  imaginative failure raises the 
question: what is responsible for the failure, the work or the appreciator? Todd appeals to cases in 
which responsibility lies with the appreciator to argue that imaginative failure does not beget 
fictionality failure, and thus does not bear on the limits of  authorial power. But it is implausible to 
think there are no constraints on authorial power and that these constraints never explain an 
appreciator’s inability to imagine. To take an extreme and obvious case, an author, and thus her work, 
cannot make everything that is fictional in 1984 fictional in another work by simply writing “Sausage”, 
not in most art-historical contexts anyway. This shows that there must be a point at which the burden 
of  responsibility for imaginative failure shifts from appreciator to work—presumably somewhat 
further down the literary scale than the sausage story. Hence my argument for restricting our concern 
to cases of  proper appreciation. Instances in which appreciators bear (sole) responsibility for 
imaginative failure are unpuzzling; this restriction removes them from our theoretical ambit. 
 Have I reneged on my earlier claim that the imaginative puzzle is genuine? No. I have made two 
consistent and related claims. First, there are cases of  imaginative failure for which appreciators do 
not bear sole responsibility; these present a real puzzle. Second, if  we approach imaginative failure as 
a pure failure of  the imagination, divorced from proper engagement with a work of  fiction, then our 
attention will be restricted to the kinds of  failures for which appreciators bear sole responsibility, 
which are not especially puzzling. 
 So, the puzzle of  imaginative failure does not lie with the imagination as pure psychological 
capacity, but as properly engaged with a work of  fiction. Proper engagement is engagement subject to 
                                            
39 Dustin Stokes also seems to be saying something along these lines in his discussion of  global and local constraints on 
imagining in his (2006, pp. 404-405). Thanks to an anonymous referee for helping me see this. 
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 normative constraints determined by the particular work of  fiction. I therefore suggest we understand 
the imaginative puzzle not as psychological but as normative in character. Since a work’s failure to 
normatively licence the appreciator’s imagining that p just is her failure to make p fictional, this 
normative understanding reveals a fruitful approach that connects our two puzzles: once we explain 
fictionality failure, an explanation for imaginative failure drops out for free. Another way to put this is 
that imaginative failure is a datum we must explain, and fictionality failure is the theoretical posit via 
which we explain it. I will show how this works in §4 when I lay out my positive proposal. 
 
 III. Dependence 
Imaginative and fictionality failure were originally thought to arise when works attempt to prescribe 
morally deviant claims, as in Giselda. However, it soon became clear that the puzzles extend to 
evaluatively deviant claims generally.40 On this characterization, the puzzles consist in explaining an 
asymmetry between descriptively deviant claims that do not generate puzzle cases (e.g. that farm 
animals carry out, and then betray, a revolution) and evaluatively deviant ones that do (e.g. that some 
actually terrible poem is fictionally good). More recent discussion has revealed that puzzle cases stretch 
beyond cases of  narrowly evaluative deviance.41 Take this case: 
 
Oval 
They flopped down beneath the great maple. One more item to find, and yet the game seemed 
lost. Hang on, Sally said. It’s staring us in the face. This is a maple tree we’re under. She grabbed a 
five-fingered leaf. Here was the oval they needed! They ran off  to claim their prize. (Yablo 2002, 
p.485) 
 
One might think puzzle cases result from attempting to prescribe impossibilities. It is impossible, one 
might argue, for female infanticide to be moral, or a five-fingered leaf  to be oval. As it stands, however, 
this is too crude. For one, we would need to specify the relevant kind of  impossibility. Physical 
impossibility will not suffice, for example, since then Superman would constitute one long puzzle case. 
                                            
40 See (Hume 1757/2007), (Walton 1990), (Moran 1994), (Walton 1994), and more recently, (Gendler 2000), (Weatherson 
2004), and (Stokes 2006). 
41 See especially (Weatherson 2004) for several candidate cases. Where these cases involve imaginative failure (as opposed 
to one of  the other three failures Weatherson considers), this puts strain on those who look to our evaluative or 
conative attitudes to solve the imaginative puzzle, such as (Currie 2002) and (Stokes 2006). For Stokes’ response, see 
(Stokes 2006, p. 403n) 
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 Princes turning into frogs (and preserving identity), time travellers interfering with their parents’ first 
courtship, the eternal ascent of  M.C. Escher’s stairs, or of  Shepard tones, are all examples that show 
metaphysical impossibility will not do either.42 
 Kendall Walton has tentatively suggested puzzle cases arise when works violate certain dependence 
relations, although which relations and why “is still a mystery” (Walton 1994, p. 44). So, for instance, 
Giselda is a puzzle case because the story violates a dependence relation between moral properties and 
“natural” ones. Brian Weatherson has developed this suggestion, calling the relevant dependence 
relation “virtue”; this is the relation between a set of  “higher-level” facts H and “lower-level” facts L, 
where the truth of  propositions in H is not primitive but holds in virtue of  the truth of  propositions 
in L. On Weatherson’s view, puzzle cases arise when an author attempts to prescribe a set of  higher-
level propositions H and lower-level ones L, where the truth of  propositions in L rule out the lower-
level facts required for the truth of  the propositions in H. Weatherson uses virtue to produce a 
solution for each puzzle. When a work violates virtue relations we believe obtain, imaginative failure 
results. When a work violates virtue relations that actually obtain, fictionality failure results 
(Weatherson 2004, p. 21). Weatherson says virtue relations are fundamental; we “import” them 
automatically into fictions such that authors cannot easily cancel them by mere say-so (Weatherson 
2004, pp. 16-17, p. 22n).43 Why is this? Weatherson appeals to a general fact about concept application; 
authors can completely determine their stories’ lower-level facts. But having done this, they enjoy no 
epistemic privilege regarding which concepts apply there (Weatherson 2004, pp. 22-23).44 
 Does Weatherson’s solution work? There is an obvious objection. And although Weatherson has 
a ready reply, it reveals a significant problem. To see this, recall the notion of  a “qualifying context”. 
In the case of  Giselda, for instance, adding the qualifying context to transform it into Giselda* removes 
the story from the class of  virtue-violating cases as well as puzzle cases, just as Weatherson’s solution 
predicts. But, runs the objection, why do readers not always resolve violations of  virtue in this way, by 
simply imagining a qualifying context (as per Stock’s proposal)? Weatherson’s response is that fictions 
come with a “That’s all” clause. He writes: 
 
                                            
42 For more on these issues see (Moran 1994, pp. 100-101), (Yablo 2002), (Stock 2006), especially pages 118-119. See also 
(Kung 2014) for an anti-Kripkean argument for imagining impossibilities that appeals to stipulation and, of  course, 
(Kripke 1980), especially pages 156-158. 
43 Though he concedes authors may be able to cancel them in works longer than the toy examples discussed in the 
literature.  
44 Weatherson’s solution is to that extent closer than it might seem to Derek Matravers’ “report model” solution. See 
(Matravers 2003). 
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 […] the instructions that go along with the fiction forbid us from imagining any relevant lower-
level facts that would constitute the truth of  the higher-level claim. We have not stressed it much 
above, but it is relevant that fictions understood as invitations to imagine have a “That’s all” clause. 
We are not imagining Death if  we imagine that Jack and Jill had just stopped arguing with each 
other and were about to shoot everyone in sight when Craig shot them in self-defence. The story 
does not explicitly say that wasn’t about to happen. It doesn’t include a “That’s all” clause. But 
such clauses have to be understood. So not only are we instructed to imagine something that seems 
incompatible with Craig’s action’s being morally acceptable; we are also instructed (tacitly) not to 
imagine anything that would make it the case that his action is morally acceptable. (Weatherson 
2004, p. 20) 
 
Weatherson’s “That’s all” clause says that we are not allowed to imagine that any relevant lower-level 
propositions—that is, any propositions relevant to the truth of  the higher-level claim(s) beyond those 
explicit in the text—are fictional in Death. But while the permissibility operator here clearly takes the 
narrowest possible scope over the proposition we imagine relevant lower-level propositions, it is unclear 
whether the universal quantifier falls under the negation’s scope or vice versa. That is, it is unclear 
which of  the following to identify as Weatherson’s “That’s all” clause: 
  
TA1: For every relevant lower level proposition, it is not the case that we are permitted to imagine 
it is fictional. 
 
TA2: It is not the case that for every relevant lower level proposition we are permitted to imagine 
it is fictional. 
 
The first sentence in the quotation could be read as endorsing TA2—i.e. that we are not allowed to 
imagine that any old virtue-preserving lower-level proposition we please is fictional; there are some 
that are forbidden by proper engagement (though there may be some that are not). The last sentence, 
however, suggests TA1 is the better reading—i.e. that there is no virtue-preserving lower level 
proposition that we are permitted to imagine is fictional. TA2 clearly won’t do the job of  Weatherson’s 
clause because readers do not need to be able to imagine any relevant lower-level propositions they 
please in order to supply a qualifying context. One set of  propositions will suffice. So that leaves us 
with TA1. But TA1 is far too strong as a general principle for literary fictions; there are plenty of  
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 lower-level propositions we do import and imagine when engaging with literary fictions, and as I will 
show, crucially, some of  these are relevant lower-level ones, i.e. virtue-preserving propositions. I will 
briefly discuss importation in fiction in general before demonstrating that TA1 is false as a general 
condition on appreciating literary fictions. 
 In perhaps the simplest case, the “Reality Principle” governs which propositions are imported into 
a fiction.45 The principle states that ceteris paribus the fictional world is like the real world: we are to 
import and thus imagine (should the question arise) any propositions true in the actual world that 
mesh with the fiction’s explicit content. Consider this passage from Orwell’s Burmese Days, to illustrate: 
 
There was a thunderous roar from the road, and such a shower of  stones that everyone was hit, 
including the Burmans on the path. One stone took Mr MacGregor full in the face, almost 
knocking him down. The Europeans bolted hastily inside and barred the door. Mr MacGregor’s 
spectacles were smashed and his nose streaming blood. (Orwell 1934/2009, p. 276) 
 
Since Mr MacGregor is human and his world much like ours, we may import the proposition that he 
dislikes being hit in the face by a stone. This, in turn, allows us to pity Mr MacGregor without the 
author needing remind us that stones to the face hurt, Mr MacGregor does not enjoy pain, and 
gratuitous pain, even to a colonial officer, warrants pity. The Reality Principle thus allows in certain 
important “generic” assumptions from the actual world. Stones can be tiny and Mr MacGregor could 
be anaesthetized or a masochist. But unless the author says otherwise, we may assume the stone to the 
face hurts and that Mr MacGregor dislikes it. 
 Returning to TA1, suppose the following appeared in a naturalistic novel: 
 
                                            
45 Sometimes, especially with historical fictions or works in special genres, the Reality Principle gives way to a different 
principle. On this, see (Walton 1990, pp. 144-161) and (Lewis 1978). Stacie Friend has suggested to me, persuasively, 
that we should accept what she calls the “Reality Assumption” instead of  the Reality Principle, which she thinks is 
similar to Gareth Evans’ “Incorporation Principle” (Evans 1980, pp. 354-356) and Marie-Laure Ryan’s “Principle of  
Minimal Departure” (Ryan 1991, pp. 48-60).  
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 Denise 
Denise went to bed complaining of  a strong headache. Her friends and family wished her 
goodnight. Three days later they buried her in the grounds of  the old church. In the circumstances, 
it was the proper thing to do. 
 
Wait! They buried Denise alive? And the author thinks killing by live burial is acceptable!? Well, no. 
Presumably, it is fictional that Denise died of  whatever ailed her and the burial was her funeral. The 
author need not state it explicitly—we import it into the fiction and imagine accordingly. Importantly, 
notice that Denise’s dying counts as a relevant virtue-preserving lower-level fact relative to the 
passage’s judgement of  propriety. Similarly, if  a story reads “Henry died, but it wasn’t at all sad” then 
usually we may import the proposition that something about Henry or his death explains why his 
death was not sad.46 So TA1 does not help either. 
 If  I had to speculate, I would guess that where Weatherson goes wrong here is in thinking that 
where authors make true some lower-level facts that explicitly, if  defeasibly, rule out some higher-level 
claims, to attempt to import lower-level propositions that will make those higher-level claims kosher 
again is ipso facto to cease engaging with the same work. Denise shows that this thought is mistaken. 
Still, Weatherson is right that something like a “That’s all” clause governs our engagement with puzzle 
cases. But since the kind of  case just considered shows that it cannot be equivalent to TA1, any such 
clause will have at most a limited jurisdiction, like TA2. Invoking a “That’s all” clause, therefore, does 
not blunt the objection. Behind the invocation lies a puzzle as difficult as the one the clause is meant 
to help solve: why do puzzle cases forbid importation of  the qualifying kind while non-puzzle cases 
allow it? 
 A tempting answer is that the Reality Principle’s preference for default propositions from the actual 
world explains why we may import the proposition that Denise died suddenly, but not that Giselda, 
say, lives in a dystopic world. If  we are told that a person retired to bed feeling ill and was “properly” 
buried three days later, it is reasonable to assume she died. But where a person “rightly” commits 
female infanticide, we might think the Reality Principle dries up. A bizarre dystopian state or a divine 
order that sends child-killers and their victims to Heaven: these additions are too exotic, or perhaps 
too ad hoc for import, even if  an author could make them fictional by explicit means. 
 Does this reply work? True, in reading Giselda we cannot just import any old crazy propositions. 
                                            
46 I discuss this kind of  non-specific or promissory importation shortly. 
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 But this is hardly necessary to render the story a non-puzzle case. Fictionally, there is some-
mechanism-or-other by which Superman flies, though we know not what it is, and there is no particular 
mechanism such that fictionally it is the mechanism. And this point generalizes: propositions 
appreciators may import are typically non-specific—i.e. to be logically analyzed as de dicto rather than 
de re. Thus, to claim that puzzle cases resist the qualifying contexts they require because these would 
be too exotic is implausible; were that the only barrier, we could always import non-specific contexts 
instead. So we are still left with a question: what about puzzle cases prevents us from importing even 
such non-specific qualifying contexts? 
 If  we are to solve our two puzzles, we must answer two questions. (1) Why do puzzle cases require 
qualifying contexts to make the propositions they attempt to prescribe fictional and imaginable? (2) 
Why can we not import such contexts into puzzle cases? Weatherson’s solution addresses (1) but not 
(2). In what follows, I describe a framework for answering both by using two central concepts, adequacy 
and exhaustivity, and sharpening them up by considering the subtleties surrounding their application.47 
  
 IV. Claims and Their Grounds 
Let us understand ‘grounds’ in ‘p are the grounds for q’ in the neutral sense—i.e. as putative or supposed 
grounds; let grounds for a claim C be inadequate whenever they fail to ground C in the normative 
sense—i.e. fail to make C true, fail to explain C; and let grounds be exhaustive whenever there are no 
additional grounds available (that is, true) that will ground C.48 C is then inadequately and exhaustively 
grounded when (a) C requires adequate grounds (i.e. is not primitive), (b) grounds for C, if  any, are 
inadequate, and (c) there are no further grounds available that will render C adequately grounded. My 
positive proposal is this: fictionality failure occurs when, on the best interpretation(s), a work attempts 
to prescribe a claim that, fictionally, is inadequately and exhaustively grounded. That is, fictionality failure 
arises when a work purports that: it is fictional that C on grounds g1,…gn, if  any, but (a) it is not fictional 
that: g1,…,gn adequately ground C; and (b) it is not fictional that: there is a proposition g*, such that g* 
is true and C is adequately grounded by g1,…,gn + g*. Of  course, when grounds for C are exhaustive, 
this does not rule out the importation of  any further propositions not made explicit by the work, since 
many ceteris paribus facts not bearing on the truth of  C will still be importable (for reasons discussed 
                                            
47 Answering questions (1) and (2) fully would require laying out complete theories of  fictional grounding and import, 
respectively. This is something I am neither able to do, nor optimistic could ever be done, for reasons I will clarify in 
the following section. 
48  I am thinking of  grounding as requiring only what is sometimes called partial grounding: namely that grounds g1,…,gn 
ground C in conjunction with the background facts. 
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 in the previous section). Exhaustivity merely rules out the importation of  relevant propositions that 
will ground C. Inadequacy explains the need for a qualifying context; existing grounds do not ground 
C, yet the work attempts to prescribe C on the basis of  those grounds. And exhaustivity explains why 
qualifying contexts cannot be imported; such contexts introduce new propositions that would ground 
C—precisely what exhaustivity rules out.49 In that respect, exhaustivity plays the role Weatherson 
intended for his “That’s all” clause. 
 As for imaginative failure of  the genuinely puzzling sort, I propose it occurs in the same cases as 
fictionality failure. This is because, as I argued in §2, the modal strength of  ‘imaginability’ is normative, 
rather than psychological or alethic. To say we cannot imagine some proposition a puzzle case attempts 
to prescribe is to make a normative claim about proper engagement, not our imaginative capacity 
simpliciter. This much is clear from comparing Giselda and Giselda*. We cannot imagine a qualifying 
context in Giselda in the same way we cannot imagine Dr. Faust breakdancing; it is not beyond us, it 
simply falls outside of  proper engagement with Goethe’s play (at least, as traditionally staged). My 
proposal, therefore, not only solves both puzzles, it does so with a single solution that explains the 
connection between them. 
 To illustrate the solution, consider Giselda again. The passage makes a moral claim and describes a 
fact about Giselda’s daughter that is supposed to ground that claim. The lack of  further information 
combined with the locution “after all” make these grounds exhaustive on a best interpretation. Being 
exhaustive, we cannot supplement them by importing anything that would amount to a qualifying 
context. Lacking such a context, the daughter’s gender is inadequate grounds for the claim, inducing 
both fictionality and imaginative failure. 
 Actually, this oversimplifies somewhat, but the complication reveals a strength of  my proposal. 
The complication is that we are consulting intuitions about vanishingly small passages, which we 
should treat with caution. We know how to engage with traditional works of  literary fiction. The terms 
of  engagement for these toy cases are murkier, however. This does not mean our intuitions about 
them are worthless. But it does mean those intuitions are more volatile than I have let on.50 When 
Walton first introduced Giselda, he did not specify the fictional context in which it figures—its position 
                                            
49 Brian Weatherson has suggested to me that exhaustivity also explains why gratuitous authorial evaluations feel odd. 
When an author gives us prima facie sufficient and exhaustive grounds to conclude that, for instance, Katharina is small, 
there is something off-putting about the author then telling us explicitly that ‘Katharina is small’. Exhaustivity secures 
Katharina’s smallness, making any explicit claim otiose. 
50 That said, accusations that the short examples are artificial and so worthless for theorizing literary fiction are often 
overblown, if  only because there is a genre of  extremely short literary fictions: micro fiction. 
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 in the text, the story’s genre etc.—but these factors shape how we view the case. I suppose Giselda is 
meant to appear in the middle of  a naturalistic story, and seen this way it is surely puzzling. However, 
suppose it was a novel’s opening line. Under this aspect, one might wonder whether Giselda counts as 
a puzzle case. Compare the famous opening from Dickens’ A Tale of  Two Cities: 
 
It was the best of  times, it was the worst of  times, it was the age of  wisdom, it was the age of  
foolishness, it was the epoch of  belief, it was the epoch of  incredulity, it was the season of  Light, 
it was the season of  Darkness, it was the spring of  hope, it was the winter of  despair, we had 
everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all 
going direct the other way... 
 
On a literal-minded reading, Dickens simply contradicts himself  repeatedly. And if  this passage ended 
the book, it might perplex us. But coming early in the book, we anticipate that any incoherence will 
be explained. And it is: 
 
...in short, the period was so far like the present period, that some of  its noisiest authorities insisted 
on its being received, for good or for evil, in the superlative degree of  comparison only. (Dickens 
1857/2008, p. 1) 
 
The same holds for Giselda. Provided we are warranted in anticipating that there is an explanation to 
come—a qualifying context—Giselda seems less puzzling. So, we must be cautious. The brevity of  our 
toy examples may make them abrupt enough to convey a sense of  finality that encourages a puzzling 
reading. Considered under a different aspect, they may require a different reading.51 My proposal 
predicts this effect. I claim that it is only when inadequate grounds for a claim are best interpreted as 
exhaustive that they induce our puzzles. Insofar as a putative puzzle case under one aspect makes the 
best interpretation one on which we should anticipate further explanation for a claim, we treat existing 
grounds as non-exhaustive. Thus, considering our toy examples under such an aspect should align 
with less puzzlement, which it does. 
 What, in a given fiction, makes some truths adequate grounds for another? In general, as said 
                                            
51 Cain Todd clearly approaches Giselda under this kind of  open-ended aspect. He writes “On first encountering [Giselda] 
my only clear instinctive reaction was to try to imagine in what fictional context this claim might be coherently asserted. 
It certainly wasn’t to resist imagining it in any clear sense.” (Todd 2009, p. 191) 
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 above, a claim is adequately grounded when its grounds explain it (in some sense) by making it true. 
And when a work is of  a naturalistic sort, the standards will be identical with those at the actual world. 
But, and here my grounding relation parts ways with Weatherson’s virtue relation, adequacy in fiction, 
like exhaustivity, is determined by factors more sensitive to context than Weatherson’s virtue. Returning 
to a passage’s position in a text, early passages containing claims that appear to be inadequately and 
exhaustively grounded (in the fiction) might make it more probable than later passages that the 
standards of  adequacy in the fiction are different to those at the actual world. Other relevant factors 
might include the genre of  a work, the explicit claims already made by the author, the remaining canon 
of  which the work forms a part, pragmatic conventions applicable to works of  its kind, the ends the 
work seems to have and how deliberately paradoxical they seem, the kinds of  claims we think the 
flesh-and-blood author is (un)likely to have false beliefs about, and so forth. One important 
consequence of  accommodating these nuances in the grounding relation is that p’s grounding q doesn’t 
require anything as strong as p’s making q true as a matter of  metaphysical necessity. 52 To see this, 
consider the following non-moral Giselda analogue: 
 
Leaves 
All across Sussex, the deciduous trees were clothed in luxuriant green foliage; after all, it was late 
autumn. 
 
Putting aside earlier worries about toy examples, I think Leaves as puzzling a case as Giselda.53 But 
notice that it violates no entrenched metaphysically necessary grounding relations. It is metaphysically 
possible for a late English autumn to explain the presence of  green leaves. Moreover, if  virtue relations 
are ones that “an author cannot cancel […] by saying so” and invitations to imagine them violated are 
ones “we cannot easily follow”, then virtue does not explain why Leaves is a puzzle case. The normal 
dependence relations in Leaves are easily cancelled by beginning the story like so: “Once upon a time, 
                                            
52  This marks an important difference between the kind of  grounding relation Kit Fine and other metaphysicians have 
in mind and the notion at play here: for Fine, the grounding relation combines a modal component and a determinative 
component (the latter being needed to prevent the fact, say, that the US invaded Panama in 1989 from grounding the 
fact that 2+2=4). See (Fine 2012, p. 38). But there could in principle be a fictional world w (or speaking more carefully: 
fictionally, there could be a world w) where none of  the worlds accessible to w have the same grounding relations. It 
would be a world where grounding is in some sense contingent. I take it this is not a possibility for the metaphysician’s 
notion. 
53 We may be less inclined to resist imagining it, since it does not contradict our cherished moral beliefs. But this difference 
is not germane given that these motivational barriers to imagination are not my concern here. For more on this, see 
(Gendler 2000), (Weinberg & Meskin 2006), (Brock 2012, pp. 449-451), and especially (Gendler 2006), where she 
cogently distinguishes two different sources of  difficulty. 
44
 trees only sprouted verdant leaves in the autumn…”. In this context, being late autumn would suffice 
to ground the otherwise (potentially) puzzling claim. Now, one might question whether beginning the 
story in this way really cancels ordinary dependence relations, or whether it just introduces a qualifying 
context. To see that there is more than mere qualifying-context-smuggling going on here, notice that 
the addition to Leaves stipulates a new dependence relation, and cancels an old one. Beginning Leaves 
with “Once upon a time, trees only sprouted verdant leaves in the autumn…” is equivalent to 
beginning Giselda with “Once upon a time, committing female infanticide was the right thing to do”. 
This is not a qualifying context but a straightforward cancellation of  ordinary dependence relations 
by mere say-so—precisely what Weatherson’s virtue relation rules out. 
 I have largely proceeded as though a work’s explicit claims, even those that are not simply explicit 
denials of  dependence relations, do not bear on whether some particular claim satisfies the standards 
of  adequacy. But what is fictional, including what the dependence relations are, is determined 
interpretatively, not investigatively. That is, a work of  fiction does not offer a fully-formed world to 
discover, but rather a body of  mutually constraining considerations that an interpretation must 
reconcile. The fact that a claim appears inadequately grounded, therefore, can itself  alter the facts of  
the fictional world, including the world’s dependence relations, just as inconsistent statements 
sometimes establish that a narrator is unreliable, rather than that the world is contradictory.54 
Otherwise inadequately supported claims might establish, stipulatively, that what are usually 
inadequate grounds are adequate after all. The strange claim in Giselda, for instance, could make it 
fictional that Giselda’s is a morally fantastical world where female infanticide is morally required. If  I 
am right about this, then contrary to some people’s suspicions, we can create “morality fiction” on the 
model of  science fiction. I see no problem with embracing this possibility. Only one in the grip of  a 
philosophical theory would deny that 12 is not the sum of  two primes in Tamar Gendler’s Tower of  
Goldbach story.55 Making some moral equivalent of  this story fictional does not seem to pose any special 
theoretical problem, even if  it would require greater imaginative exertion—or more writerly craft to 
transport the appreciator, just as with works that get us to really see a world from a character’s morally 
perverse perspective.56 At the very least, intuitions about this possibility are probably not firm enough 
                                            
54 Cain Todd argues this point forcefully, citing Peter Lamarque. See (Todd 2009, pp. 205-206) and (Lamarque 
1990/2002). There is also a good discussion of  related issues by Daniel Nolan (2007) discussing Graham Priest’s 
Sylvan’s Box story; see (Priest 1997). 
55 See (Gendler 2000). Kathleen Stock denies it in (Stock 2003). 
56 This is a huge area that I cannot do justice to here. Matthew Kieran offers some excellent examples of  fictions where 
the moral facts seem to be successfully perverted in (Kieran 2003, pp. 69-71). A full defence of  my permissive notion 
of  imaginability will have to wait for another time, or author. (Kung 2014) comes very close to my thinking. 
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 to reject it outright.57 One might worry: if  the standards of  adequacy can be so straightforwardly 
altered, why are there puzzle cases at all? Bearing in mind the above caveats about toy examples, the 
answer seems to be that some passages are subject to interpretative constraints, some of  them listed 
above, such that reading these passages as stipulating new dependency relations is simply 
interpretatively inappropriate. 
 Accepting that my proposal explains cases like Giselda, does it explain those involving conceptual 
impossibility like Oval? They can be handled in the same way as the others. While the story does not 
say that the object found was an oval because it was a five-fingered maple leaf, clearly being five-
fingered is the putative ground for the claim. Without any fantastical stipulation to the contrary, being 
five-fingered is inconsistent with, and a fortiori inadequate grounds for, being oval. My proposal says 
that to be a puzzle case the grounds must be not only inadequate but exhaustive. I hope to have shown 
by now that exhaustivity, like adequacy, depends upon a number of  contextual factors that our toy 
examples disguise. Insofar as Oval forms part of  a conceptually fantastical story whose details we are 
yet to discover, the grounds are not exhaustive and the story no puzzle case. Insofar as we should 
interpret the relevant content of  Oval as final, the grounds are exhaustive and the story a puzzle case. 
 A benefit of  my proposal is that it is immune to counterexamples recently introduced by Anna 
Mahtani against so-called “conflict” solutions to the imaginative puzzle that superficially resemble my 
own. These solutions appeal to a conflict between an author’s claim and an appreciator’s belief. An 
example is Walton’s suggestion that puzzle cases arise when authorial attempts at prescription violate 
dependence relations as we take them to be. Mahtani offers The Story of  Lucy as a counterexample to 
such views. The story describes a morally ambiguous action by the protagonist, Lucy, followed by an 
authorial pronouncement that the action was right. The purported problem for conflict solutions is 
that while Lucy is a puzzle case, it does not appear to involve conflict; it is unclear whether Lucy did 
the right thing, but she may have done. To say that she did, therefore, does not conflict with anything 
appreciators believe (Mahtani 2012). 
 For Lucy to count as a theoretically interesting case that induces imaginative failure, a sufficiently 
ideal appreciator must find Lucy’s action either (a) morally unclear or (b) not morally right. How case 
(b) would induce imaginative failure on my view requires no elaboration, so I will focus on (a). Suppose 
that to engage in proper appreciation one must be morally omniscient. If  Lucy’s action is morally 
unclear to such a morally omniscient appreciator, this merely shows that the action’s deontic character 
                                            
57 Of  course, imagining comes in many strengths and it is surely true that we cannot imagine Gendler’s story with the 
ease and vivacity that we can imagine, say, Maaza Mengiste’s Beneath the Lion’s Gaze. 
46
 is genuinely indeterminate. Thus it will present a puzzle case, since the work will then claim that a 
morally indeterminate action is morally right. Barring any special features of  the literary context, such 
a work will have offered inadequate (and exhaustive) grounds for a claim. If, on the other hand, proper 
appreciation merely requires minimal moral competence, rather than omniscience, such that one 
sufficiently ideal appreciator might deem Lucy’s action morally unclear, while another deems it morally 
right, then the example would seem to be a puzzle case for the former but not the latter. Does this 
pose a problem for my proposal? It does not, as I will explain. 
 One might worry that accepting the possibility of  sufficiently ideal appreciators who disagree is 
just to accept Todd’s relativity worry—i.e. the worry that imaginative failure is imaginer-relative due to 
varying theoretical commitments. But this worry is unwarranted. The cases to which Todd appeals to 
divorce fictionality from imaginability all involve obvious deficiencies on the part of  the appreciator. 
But where sufficiently ideal appreciators disagree, this suggests we finesse our understanding of  what 
is fictional, not revise the connections between fiction and the imagination. Returning to Lucy, if  these 
appreciators disagree about whether or not Lucy’s action is right, then it seems we have two options. 
The first is to conclude from the disagreement that Lucy’s action is morally indeterminate. This would 
be akin to the way in which ‘x is F’ lacks a truth-value according to supervaluationism whenever F is 
a vague predicate and x is a borderline F-case (i.e. ‘x is F’ is true under some precisifications of  F and 
false under others). On this picture, Lucy’s action would be right (or wrong) only if  all sufficiently 
ideal appreciators judged it right (or wrong); pursuing the supervaluationist analogy, this would be akin 
to a vagueness case in which ‘x is F’ is supertrue (or superfalse)—i.e. true (false) under all precisifications 
of  F.  Otherwise, so long as not all the sufficiently ideal appreciators agree, the action is morally 
indeterminate. How plausible this approach is to settling on what is true in a fiction will depend in 
part on which requirements remain constant across proper appreciations; the greater the variability 
across such appreciations, the fewer things one will be able to determine are fictional. 
 If  this first strategy is consonant with a form of  critical monism, the second is pluralist. According 
to the second strategy, we embrace a new and equally privileged interpretation of  Lucy for each 
different moral judgement made by sufficiently ideal appreciators regarding Lucy’s action. On some 
of  these interpretations, her action will be right, on others it will be indeterminate, or wrong, giving 
us at least three interpretations of  what the story makes fictional.58 
                                            
58 Can fictional actions still be morally ambiguous but not indeterminate? Moral ambiguity strikes me as an epistemic 
notion, so it is not clear that the fictional world can be morally ambiguous, even if  it may seem so (usually because it is 
morally indeterminate). Works that defy a stable judgement, or which make understanding how the work induces moral 
disagreement among (sufficiently ideal) appreciators important will be aptly described as morally ambiguous. David 
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  Importantly, whichever of  these two strategies we employ, my account remains unblemished. If  
the first strategy is preferable, then Lucy and cases like it are puzzle cases; sufficiently ideal appreciators 
disagree as to the rightness of  Lucy’s action, thereby indicating that it is morally indeterminate. Should 
the work therefore claim that Lucy acted rightly, that claim will be inadequately grounded. And 
assuming, as I have been, that these grounds are also exhaustive, we will have a puzzle case. 
Alternatively, if  the second strategy is preferable, then we may have at least two interpretations—two 
mutually incompatible but equally legitimate accounts of  what is fictional in the work. The 
interpretation on which Lucy’s action is morally indeterminate receives the same treatment as on the 
first option: Lucy thusly interpreted will constitute a puzzle case. The interpretation on which Lucy’s 
action is morally right will, however, not present a puzzle case. On this interpretation, the work’s claim 
that Lucy acted rightly will be adequately grounded, hence unpuzzling. In short, insofar as Lucy and 
cases like it present a puzzle case, my account can explain why. 
 
 V. Conclusion 
In this paper, I had three main aims. First, I defended the claim that puzzle cases present two real 
puzzles: the imaginative puzzle and the fictionality puzzle. Second, I showed how both puzzles are 
connected: imaginative failure of  the puzzling kind is the result of  a normative constraint on imagining 
laid down by what is fictional in the puzzling work. Third, I used this connection to articulate a 
common explanation for the central puzzling phenomena, imaginative and fictionality failure: both 
arise when authors offer grounds for claims that are inadequate and exhaustive. 
 
  
                                            
Mamet’s play Oleanna might be like this latter case insofar as it exploits gender to encourage different moral judgements 
of  John’s and Carol’s respective actions in differently gendered appreciators. 
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Chapter Three 
Is Sport Make-believe?† 
 
Was ist die Lust der Welt? Nichts als ein Fastnachtsspiel, 
So lange Zeit gehofft, in kurzter Zeit verschwindet, 
Da unsre Masquen uns nicht hafften wie man wil, 
Und da der Anschlag nicht den Ausschlag recht empfindet, 
Es gehet uns wie dem, der Feuerwercke macht, 
Ein Augenblick verzeht offt eines Jahres Sorgen; 
Man schaut wie unser Fleiß von Kindern wird verlacht, 
Der Abend tadelt offt den Mittag und den Morgen 
- Christian Hofmann von Hofmannswaldau, ‘Die Welt’ 
 
In late 1941, as German bombs began falling around Britain, marking the beginning of  the Blitz, an 
incredible list of  “temporary rules” attributed to London’s Richmond Golf  Club began circulating in 
British and American newspapers. The rules stipulate how to proceed with a game of  golf  given 
certain hazards of  war. Rule 2, for instance, instructs players that “during gunfire or while bombs are 
falling, players may take shelter without penalty for ceasing play.” Rule 6 states that “A player whose 
stroke is affected by the simultaneous explosion of  a bomb may play another ball under penalty of  
one stroke.” The document’s veracity is unclear; different sources trace it to different places, even 
different years. It might be genuine, tongue-in-cheek, or mere propaganda, symbolizing a British “stiff  
upper-lip”. Regardless, the rules supply a caricature of  the apparent absurdity all competitive games 
share: sometimes, we appear to care intensely about their outcomes, even as bombs fall around our feet, 
                                            
†  My thanks to Ken Walton, Bryan Parkhurst, Dan Jacobson, Gregg Crane, Sarah Buss, and my colleagues who 
participated in both Michigan’s Candidacy Seminar (2013-14) and the Graduate Student Working Group. Thanks 
also to audiences at the University of  Lund and the annual meeting of  the American Society for Aesthetics (2013). 
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 while acknowledging that those outcomes do not by themselves matter. This, in germ, is what I will 
call the Puzzle of  Sport.59 
 In this paper I consider a solution to this puzzle according to which our puzzling attitudes to 
competitive game outcomes (CGOs) are explained in terms of  make-believe. I argue that the solution 
faces a number of  theoretical challenges. In §1, I define the Puzzle of  Sport precisely and describe the 
make-believe solution. In §2, I criticize this solution, before sketching alternatives in §3. I close by 
considering whether make-believe still plays a role in these alternative explanations; I conclude that it 
might. 
 
 I. The Puzzle and the Solution 
 1.1 What are Competitive Games? 
Why do we often (appear to) care so much about CGOs, such as who wins, or whether a record is 
broken, while simultaneously denying that these outcomes are important? This discrepancy in attitudes 
demands explanation. One possibility is that make-believe—as understood by Kendall Walton—
explains it. Just as we engage in a normatively constrained imaginative activity when participating in 
children’s games of  make-believe and appreciating works of  traditional fiction, the claim goes, so we 
sometimes also engage in this activity when participating in competitive games. Call this claim about 
sports ‘SMB’ (for ‘Sports as Make-believe’). 
 What does it mean for sports60 to be, in Walton’s words, “occasions for make-believe”?61 The claim 
is not that sports are imaginary; during a football match, there really are people kicking a ball around 
a field. The claim is that participation in competitive games, whether as player or spectator, is the locus 
of  make-believe (Walton 2015, 75-76), though, not that participants62 pretend to play or spectate by 
acting out roles as mimes do. Rather, spectators’ pretence—their engagement in make-believe—
consists in adopting certain attitudes toward CGOs. Specifically, SMB claims, though participants may 
not actually believe the outcome matters, they engage imaginatively in a make-believe game in which 
it is fictional—true in the game—that it matters a lot. 
                                            
59 The puzzle is discussed most recently by Kendall Walton (Walton 2015) and Paul A. Taylor (Taylor manuscript). Close 
cousins of  the puzzle also appear in (Feezell, 2004), (Morgan, 2007). 
60 For readers familiar with Bernard Suits’ distinctions on this score, my use of  ‘sport’ differs from his. ‘Sport’, for Suits, 
is a subdivision of  ‘game’, and refers, roughly, to games played seriously, rather than ‘just for fun’. My use of  ‘sport’ 
follows Walton’s usage, which is more or less interchangeable with Suits’ ‘game’. See e.g. (Suits 1988) and (Schneider, 
2001). 
61 Throughout, I use ‘make-believe’, ‘fiction’, and grammatical variants more or less synonymously, though they do come 
apart in subtle ways of  no concern to us here. 
62 I use ‘participate’ and its grammatical variants throughout to refer to both competing and spectating. 
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  Let me anticipate three tempting mistakes concerning SMB’s scope. First, the relevant activities 
are ones with competitive outcomes. So, although traditionally non-competitive sports such as hiking 
or rock-climbing might not appear relevant, this relies on a crude distinction between the competitive 
and non-competitive. Two hikers may race each other up a hill, for instance. Similarly, while 
competitive sports like football and basketball are typically competitive, they need not be. A group 
absent-mindedly passing a ball around might be said to be playing football, given permissive criteria 
for individuating sports. Second, the puzzle includes competitive games in general, whether or not 
these count as sports, such as board games, and some children’s games, not just sports. Third, 
competitive games need not involve more than one participant; an individual participant may compete 
against herself, or establish other conditions of  success, such as climbing to a certain rock.63 
 So what is a competitive game? I will leave this question without a rigorous answer. A necessary 
condition upon x’s being a competitive game is that x be an activity played with success conditions in 
mind. These success conditions—often given by what Bernard Suits calls ‘prelusory’64 goals—are 
needed to generate the puzzle. Pointing to paradigmatic examples also helps anchor the notion: 
common varieties of  football, tennis, and basketball, as well as ‘It’, ‘Pooh Sticks’, ‘British Bulldog’, and 
similar children’s games count. Making toast, waiting for the bus, filing one’s taxes do not, even if  we 
perform some of  these activities with success conditions in mind.65 
 
  1.2 SMB 
A putative analogy between our engagement with fiction and our engagement with sport motivates 
SMB. Both activities can seem similarly puzzling. First, we easily recover after experiencing tragedy in 
sport, as in fiction, even when the tragedy moves us greatly. Walton writes: 
 
                                            
63 I will switch between ‘sport’ and ‘competitive game’ throughout, though I intend all competitive games, unless this 
clearly is not my intention. 
64 A prelusory goal is the overarching aim of  a given game that can be articulated independently of  the game. The 
prelusory goal of  basketball, for instance, is to get the ball in the hoop (and prevent your opponent from doing the 
same). 
65 An important caveat here is that making toast and filing one’s taxes on time could be competitive games, embedded in 
the right kind of  context. Clearly, a lot hangs on what falls under the concept GAME. Unfortunately, giving a successful 
account of  this concept is notoriously tricky, as Wittgenstein famously noted in his discussion of  “family 
resemblances”. Bernard Suits (1978) has a thorough and sophisticated account of  the concept, though I have concerns 
about how successful he ultimately is. Discussing these, however, would take us too far afield. So, for the purposes of  
this paper, we must again be satisfied with an intuitive understanding of  the notion. Whatever turns out to be the 
correct account of  what games are, provided it is not horrendously revisionary, can be plugged into the discussion. 
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 Many forget the game quickly after it is over, much too quickly for people who care as much as 
they seem to care during the game [...] It is hard to resist comparing the avid sports fan to the 
playgoer who sheds bitter and voluminous tears over the tragic fate of  Romeo and Juliet, and 
twenty minutes later has a jolly good time with her friends at an espresso bar. [...] Afterwards, like 
the playgoer, she steps outside of  the make-believe and goes back to living her life as though 
nothing much had happened—even if  the home team suffered a devastating and humiliating 
defeat. It’s just a story; it’s just a game. (Walton 2015, 77) 
 
A person undergoes the emotional pitch and roll of  a theatrical performance. The final curtain falls, 
her tears dry, and life continues unperturbed. A sports fan shouts with joy as her team take the lead 
and agonizes when they later relinquish it. The game ends, she heaves a sigh, and life goes on 
unperturbed. Both spectators, according to SMB, engage in make-believe during the spectacle, only to 
return to actuality once it ends. Because of  the unique way that make-believe attitudes operate in our 
psychological economy, they promise to explain our odd ability to appear to care greatly about 
something at one moment and be suddenly unconcerned with it at the next. 
 Second, our behaviour while participating in competitive games, as when engaging with fictional 
events, suggests we care greatly about their outcomes. Yet, at a calmer hour, we frequently concede 
that those outcomes do not really matter, (at least, not as much as our participatory behaviour 
suggested). Walton again: 
 
Why should people care about the Yankees or the Red Sox? Their fortunes on the field have no 
obvious bearing on the welfare of  most fans. Why does it matter whether the home team wins or 
loses? Life will go on just as it did before, regardless. But the spectators, some of  them, scream 
their hearts out during the game, as though it is a matter of  life and death. Some people pick which 
players to “like”, which ones to root for, more or less arbitrarily, on whims [...]. Yet they may let 
themselves be carried away during the game, as though genuine and substantial values or self-
interest is at stake. (Walton 2015, 76-77) 
 
To facilitate expression, I will say the extent to which we are moved to excitement by a CGO evinces 
our caring attitudes toward that outcome. The extent to which we explicitly (dis)avow the importance 
of  a CGO evinces prima facie the amount we believe the outcome to matter. Thus, one can phrase the puzzle 
like so: why is it that participants’ caring attitudes towards CGOs are so intense, when they do not 
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 believe those outcomes matter? Of  course, it is worth noting an important qualification here. Some 
CGOs can and do matter to us—really matter. CGOs can matter to us instrumentally because 
consequences of  real importance depend on them (Walton 2015). The Iraq national football team 
under Uday Hussein had good reason to care about their performances; Hussein would motivate them 
“by threatening to amputate their legs if  they lost” (Kuper & Szymanski, p. 278) among other outrages. 
So, the question applies only to some instances of  participation, if  any. 
 The loosely analogous puzzle in the case of  traditional fiction is known as the Puzzle (sometimes 
“Paradox”) of  Fiction: 
 
(1) Things that we believe do not exist cannot be the intentional objects of  our emotions.66 
(2) We believe that fictional events or characters per se do not exist. 
(3) Fictional events and characters per se are the intentional objects of  our emotions.67 
 
To resolve the puzzle, one must reject one of  the three propositions, assuming there is no ambiguity. 
But this is tricky. Claim (1) looks undeniable; it seems impossible to emote about something one 
believes does not exist (notwithstanding intuitions to the contrary generated by the case of  fiction 
                                            
66 There might be Frege-puzzle type cases involving unknown identities that falsify (1). Suppose Amilie believes that 
George Orwell exists and that Eric Blair does not. If  Amilie loves George Orwell and thus, George Orwell is the 
intentional object of  her love-attitude, then one might be tempted to say Eric Blair is also the intentional object of  
her love-attitude, falsifying (1). I think something like a requirement that the intentional object be intentional under 
some description makes this apparent problem disappear. Indeed, the whole theory of  Fregean senses is premised on 
such a move; it allows that terms can differ in cognitive significance (non-denotative meaning) despite sharing a 
referent. 
As it stands, it is unclear why this is a puzzle at all; arguably, proposition (1) is clearly false: possible events can 
be the objects of  an intentional attitude, as when I fear what someone might do to me. Radford, who offers what is 
widely regarded as the original formulation of  the puzzle (see footnote 10), acknowledges this much but points out 
that what is distinctive about fictions is that the intensity of  our responses to fictional events, say, does not track 
probability as our responses to possible events do. Ordinary appreciators get just as worked up about fictional events 
knowing that they are not and, often, could not be actual. But ordinary people contemplating possibilities, insofar as they 
are rational, get more or less worked up as a possibility becomes more or less likely, respectively. Those cases in which 
we get worked up about far-flung possibilities are too close to the explanandum to supply a counterexample (Radford 
1975, 73-74). 
67 The puzzle has been posed (sometimes implicitly) in the following way: 
 
 1. We respond emotionally to a thing only if  we believe the thing to be real. 
 2. We do not believe the events or characters in fictions to be real. 
 3. We respond emotionally to the events and characters in fictions. 
 
 However, this is an ambiguous formulation of  the paradox, even though I think it is, for example, Radford’s. See 
(Radford 1975), (Stear, 2009, 26). “Respond emotionally to” can be read causally—e.g. that fictional entities and events 
can cause our emotions—or intentionally—that fictional entities can be the intentional objects of  our emotions. (1) is 
obviously false on the causal reading, since beliefs can be false and an emotion’s cause need not be its object; lack of  
sleep might cause me to be angry at my brother, for instance. 
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 itself). Claim (2) is likewise difficult to deny, since, for all the talk of  “suspending disbelief ” we clearly 
do not doubt Sherlock Homes’ non-existence, for instance. But claim (3) looks right, too to anyone 
who has engaged with a work of  fiction. After all, we speak naturally of  despising James Bond (at 
least we ought to!), feeling sorry for John Flory, and admiring Jane Eyre. Pre-theoretically, this talk 
appears quite literal. 
 There are doubts about whether Walton’s theory of  make-believe really addresses the Puzzle of  
Fiction as it has been framed in the literature, and how important solving this puzzle is to motivating 
the theory (by my lights, it is not very important).68 Nevertheless, the way I have framed the Puzzle, 
and how the theory solves it, provides a useful way of  clarifying the theory and its relevance to the 
Puzzle of  Sport. These caveats aside, Walton’s solution is to deny claim (3). The proposal is that it is 
not literally true that, for instance, I loathe James Bond, since I know there is no James Bond. Rather, 
it is fictional that I loathe him. Correspondingly, my utterance ‘I find James Bond loathsome’ does not 
assert a proposition (not the obvious one at any rate), but is instead a move in the game making it 
fictional that I assert that I find James Bond loathsome. In other words, the speech-act conceals a 
fictionality operator that takes scope over the whole sentence.69 Similarly, when I feel the urge to gag 
as Bond oozes yet more misogyny, it is not literally true that James Bond disgusts me (even if  I literally 
experience feelings of  disgust); it is fictional that he does. What is literally true—true at the actual 
world—is that the film causes me to feel certain physiological sensations, such as the need to gag. 
Whether or not one counts these among the instances of  genuine emotion, they are examples of  what 
Walton calls “quasi-emotions”, physiological states (prompted by a work of  fiction) that resemble the 
physiological states of  genuine emotions, even if  they lack their motivating force (Walton 1990, 195-
204). Walton’s profound insight is that these quasi-emotions act as “props” in make-believe games, 
“playing the part” of  real emotions. To return, reluctantly, to James Bond, the actual gagging sensation 
combines with what Walton calls a “principle of  generation”—a function from true propositions to 
fictional ones—making it fictional in the game I play with the film that James Bond disgusts me. This 
works in much the same way that a toy might be a prop that ‘plays the part’ of  a car in a child’s game, 
or the toy-car’s actually sliding into a cereal box makes it fictional that a real car has crashed into a wall. 
                                            
68 See, for instance, (Matravers 2014), especially chapter 8. 
69 This explains why my loathing James Bond feels like a de re attitude about a particular individual I have in mind, 
James Bond, even while I know that there is no such individual. For while it is not the case that there exists an 
individual such that, fictionally, he is James Bond and I think him a cretin, it is true that fictionally, there exists an 
individual such that he is James Bond and I think him a cretin. Fictionally, my attitude is de re. 
56
  The sporting case appears to throw up an analogous puzzle. Let a caring-attitude toward x be an 
attitude that explains70 various emotional dispositions toward x typical of  a state of  caring—
dispositions to worry about, dread, and feel joy etc. toward x. Then, as a first approximation, one 
might capture the present puzzle as follows: 
 
(1) Things that we believe do not matter cannot be the intentional objects of  a caring-attitude.71 
(2) For some CGO o, and some agent s, s does not believe that o matters. 
(3) s has a caring-attitude of  which o is the intentional object. 
 
The analogous solution would seem to be to deny claim (3); S does not literally care about o, she does 
so fictionally. However, while the ability to have emotional attitudes toward fictional entities is an all-
or-nothing affair—you either can or cannot have them—how much something matters to someone 
admits of  degrees. For instance, it matters a lot to me that my dog not be endangered. It also matters 
to me, though less, that she not soil the carpet. The existence of  x, by contrast, admits of  no degrees,72 
(the question ‘how much does x exist?’ is barely intelligible). In competitive games, therefore, make-
believe is needed (if  at all) not merely when the outcomes are believed not to matter, but also when 
they are believed to matter less than our participatory behaviour suggests. 
 One ought to reformulate the puzzle like so. 
 
(1) The amount to which we care about a thing cannot exceed the amount we believe the thing 
matters. 
(2) We care a great deal about some CGOs 
(3) We do not believe those CGOs matter very much, if  at all. 
 
More rigorously, for any event e, and any agent s: 
 
                                            
70 Whether this explanation is causal or constitutive is not terribly important. 
71 There might be counterexamples, again, to this, but not ones that should worry us. See above. 
72 I am ignoring doxastic talk couched in terms of  partial credences here. This is not because I think such talk is 
unavailable to a theorist of  fiction. It is available to her, and admitting such talk in the case of  fiction would render 
the two puzzles more perfectly analogous. Rather, I find it deeply implausible to think we ever have credences (except 
perhaps in aberrant cases) about the existence of  fictional entities greater than naught. We are not unsure whether 
Sherlock Homes exists, for instance. Walton argues this point cogently in his (1990, 197-198). 
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 (1) If  s has caring-attitudes of  degree n toward e, then s believes e matters to (at least)73 degree n. 
 
And For some agent s, some CGO o, and some values j, k such that j is strictly less than k: 
 
(2) s believes o matters to degree j. 
(3) s has caring-attitudes of  degree k toward o. 
 
Since claims (2) and (3) rely on relative values, one might think that rejecting either amounts to the 
same thing. But there is an aspectual difference between rejecting one rather than the other. To reject 
(2) is to revise s’s belief about how much o matters up to the level of  s’s caring-attitude towards o. It is 
to reject s’s calm ‘concession’ that she does not believe o really matters (that much). To reject (3), by 
comparison, is to revise the level of  s’s caring-attitude toward o down to the level of  s’s belief  about 
how much o matters. It is to reject the appearance of  intense caring as genuinely evincing the extent 
to which s cares about o. SMB, then, amounts to this. On those occasions where caring-attitudes appear 
to outstrip a belief  in a CGO’s importance, this appearance is explained by make-believe (at least, 
where the participant is not simply irrational). Fictionally, the participant cares about o to greater degree 
k (because fictionally she believes the outcome to matter to degree k), though actually she cares about 
the outcome only to degree j, since actually she believes o only to matter to degree j. The imagination 
bridges the gap, so to speak, from the belief  to the caring-attitude, from j to k.  
 
 II. Evaluating SMB 
In this section I advance objections to SMB that, cumulatively, cast doubt on its plausibility. In §§ 2.1 
and 2.2, I argue that two reasons for adopting SMB overgeneralize, committing one who accepts SMB 
on these grounds to one of  two options: 
 
A. Apply the same make-believe analysis to these other activities. 
B. Do not apply the same make-believe analysis. 
 
If  one opts for B, one faces two more choices: 
 
                                            
73 I am leaving open the possibility that we can care about x to a degree strictly less than is warranted by how much we 
believe x matters. 
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 B1. Identify a salient difference between these other activities and competitive games. 
B2. Do not identify such a difference. 
 
I argue that neither A nor B1 are attractive, leaving B2. By modus tollens this gives one grounds to reject 
SMB. In §2.4-2.6, I consider other problems that the SMB proponent must address. 
 
  2.1 Caring about That which does not Matter (Enough) 
Appealing to make-believe to explain our apparently disproportionate caring attitudes concerning 
CGOs may be too quick, for such apparent disproportionality is common in other cases that do not 
plausibly involve make-believe. Some examples: narrowly managing to catch a bus for which one was 
running late, or missing one; losing a distantly espied but desirable parking spot; finishing a very long 
book like War and Peace; having the radio cut out, or threaten to, in the middle of  the broadcast of  a 
gripping anecdote that one chanced upon; making a green (or yellow) traffic light; settling a petty 
argument; having the last word; finding out some item of  trivia once brought to one’s attention. 
Generally, these kinds of  events are not believed by their agents to be important enough to warrant 
total attention, cheering, or agonizing, yet cause them to focus, cheer, or agonize. Nor do they 
intuitively involve anything like make-believe. 
 Hobbies furnish more examples. A stamp collector may devote a great amount of  time and energy 
to her collection, even doing so to her financial detriment, while conceding that collecting stamps 
probably is not very important.74 Train-spotting is a pastime in which the spotter keeps a record of  
the trains she has seen by recording the model or number, typically with the intention of  seeing all the 
trains, train types, or train carriages of  a given company or region. Train-spotters often pursue their 
pastime at great expense, braving long journeys, financial burdens, and driving rain to scribble a 
number into a notebook. They meet the sight of  some trains with great delight, and the missing of  
others with great regret. Were a sufficient number of  obstacles placed in the train-spotter’s way, she 
might even scream and sob with joy. Nevertheless, even a train-spotter would surely admit that seeing 
                                            
74 Walton touches on rareness in another paper, suggesting there that we may only pretend—that is imagine—that 
rareness is valuable in itself. As with the case of  sports, my intuitions pull me much the other way. Indeed, besides the 
common observation that rareness increases a thing’s (exchange) value (think of  supply-demand curves), there is 
psychological research that may support the claim that we find rareness valuable. A recent study, building on a wealth 
of  prior supporting data, shows that subjects rate chocolates introduced as the “last chocolate” more highly than 
identical chocolates not so introduced  (O'Brien & Ellsworth, 2012). Being hard-wired or socialized to value rareness 
would explain this data. Moreover, it seems plausible to think that humans would have evolved to more greatly 
appreciate a scarce resource. Of  course, systematic make-believe that rareness is valuable would also explain this 
phenomenon—but the burden of  proof  is on the make-believe theorist to motivate her less straightforward account. 
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 some train and pencilling down its number is not really important. Another example: a traveller might 
sincerely cheer when she finally visits the last of  all the capitals of  Europe. 
 The possibility these examples raise is that the same mechanism underwriting our disproportionate 
excitement concerning CGOs occurs in many activities that are not obviously games, and, partly for 
that reason, are not as amenable to being analyzed along the lines of  SMB. Moreover, even if  the 
examples are not decisive (perhaps there is something game-like to what the traveller and stamp-
collector do), they appear to be on a continuum with other activities that surely do not involve make-
believe. 
 Take the case of  someone building an elaborate sandcastle for her own amusement. After several 
failed attempts to erect the grand spire, she suddenly finds herself  having erected most of  it with only 
a few more centimetres to go. The tension builds as the last few dollops are carefully patted into place, 
just as it does for a team guarding a narrow lead in the dying minutes of  a game. She becomes 
profoundly aware that the slightest error could topple the structure. As she finally inserts the crowning 
toothpick flag, she gives a fistpump.  Or think of  the gradual epiphany as a logical puzzle and its 
solution become suddenly understandable. While skills in logic might be worthwhile developing, the 
problem-solver might acknowledge that her understanding any particular solution does not really 
matter. She could drop the puzzle and move on with her life unperturbed. And yet, as she finally 
grasps how the solution works, she might throw the paper and pencil up in the air with delight, 
especially if  the problem is difficult. The solution could be to a sophisticated derivation, or to a Sudoku 
puzzle, and yet elicit the same reaction. Practical jokes furnish excellent examples to consider. Two 
friends have set a trap by placing a cup of  water precariously on the top of  a front door that is cracked 
ajar. They hear the third friend approach the door, completely oblivious. The tension rises—what if  
she notices the cup, spoiling the prank? What if  the cup misses its target? Suddenly, the butt of  the 
joke takes the door handle, only to release it again upon realizing she has left something in her car. 
The pranksters release an involuntary, pained squeal and hear her walk away again. The wait is 
agonizing. Finally, just as it seems the oblivious target will never open the door, she does. The cup 
falls, the victim is drenched, and the pranksters cry with laughter. Clearly, the pranksters’ reactions far 
exceed a level warranted by their beliefs about the importance of  the prank’s success. Nor is this kind 
of  phenomenon restricted to relatively unusual cases furnished by practical jokes, logic puzzles, or 
building sandcastles. There is also completing a passage on a musical instrument, building a house of  
cards, completing all one’s chores. Indeed, mundane examples in which caring-attitudes seems to 
outstrip beliefs about how much something matters abound. Think of  the agonized lunges and yelps 
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 we perform when spotting a glass of  wine topple onto the floor, even an easily cleaned floor, or a cup 
of  tea slip off  a breakfast tray, or a puppy adopting that all too familiar squat on the carpet. These 
often elicit the kinds of  apparently “life and death” reactions any sports fan of  the relevant kind 
exhibits. Nor need these moments be sudden and intense. We frequently find ourselves engrossed in 
the most banal activities as though little else mattered. In 2010, I waited in line for President Barack 
Obama’s Commencement Day speech at Michigan Stadium. Standing among the motionless throngs 
waiting to enter the Big House, a woman was having trouble with the zip on her fleece. As she and 
her partner took one futile turn after another to fix it, a small crowd began to form around them to 
watch—swapping notes on fixing zips, even predicting the eventual outcome of  the present attempt. 
Here then were tens of  adults and a couple of  children fascinated by the fortunes of  some unknown 
person and her rogue zip. I never did see her repair it. But had she done so, one could imagine a cheer 
going out, or perhaps a round of  applause, from the crowd, and not necessarily a tongue-in-cheek 
one. I am inclined to think that what is going on in most if  not all of  these examples involves no 
make-believe. Why not? These examples’ proximity to (or identity with) ordinary unproblematic cases 
of  caring mean that explaining them in terms of  make-believe threatens to apply the notion too 
generously; if  they all involve make-believe, then one begins to lose one’s grip on how caring in 
imagination about some actual thing differs, even in principle, from actually caring about it. The worry, 
in a tendentious slogan, is that if  make-believe is everywhere then it is nowhere. For the same reason, 
applying a make-believe analysis to these examples also undermines the extent to which sport is 
supposed to present a particular puzzle. I return to this point shortly. If  I am right to decline a make-
believe analysis of  these examples, then whatever they do involve may also cover the case of  sports, 
rendering SMB unnecessary. 
  
  2.2 Recovering after Tragedy 
Another motivation for SMB is the apparent incongruity between how much we appear to care about 
CGOs and how quickly we “get over” disappointing outcomes once the contest finishes. This 
resembles cases in which we are moved by works of  fictional tragedy, but get on with our lives 
unruffled shortly afterwards. However, eerily quick recovery times are not limited to engagements 
with sport and fiction. Regarding matters of  the utmost gravity, we often exhibit a similar ability to 
put them out of  our minds very quickly. Take the familiar example of  the evening news. We frequently 
see how lives are destroyed by war, repression, and (un)natural disasters. This may hit us hard and 
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 move us deeply. Yet, often, we put down our smart-phones, turn off  our televisions or radios, and 
find our concern quickly lost in the dust of  mundane activity. 
 The proponent of  SMB has a rebuttal. Bad news may not continue to affect us in such cases 
because we are able to put it out of  mind. But often, if  we remain vividly aware of  the news, or are 
reminded of  it later, it may continue to affect us emotionally. Sports “disasters”, on the other hand, 
are not like this; continued vivid awareness, or later reminders, are likely to fail to affect us—at least 
some of  us, some of  the time. Moreover, whereas the tragedies that induce our concern through the 
news often involve distant and unfamiliar people, only sporting cases that directly affect us ever move 
us to express a similar degree of  apparent concern. (Walton 2015, 77n). 
 Responding to these points in reverse: first, even conceding that concern for CGOs is typically 
egocentric, there are exceptions. When Oscar Pistorius, a South African double leg amputee, competed 
in the 2012 Olympic alongside able-bodied athletes, many were delighted to see him finish second in 
his qualifying heat, and devastated by his eighth place finish in the semi-finals. The reasons for this 
interest are probably multiple with both symbolic and instrumental aspects to them.  But I suspect it 
did not entirely reduce to Pistorius’ role as symbol of, or catalyst for, disabled achievement. And it is 
implausible that it is explained by fans’ well-established investment in Pistorius; many had not heard 
of  him until the 2012 Games. Rather, the interest seems also to have concerned his simply doing well 
at the Olympics and winning his races, for their own sake. Similarly, millions felt tremendous pity when 
hosts Brazil were “humiliated, humbled, and taken apart” (BBC 2014) by Germany in the semi-final 
of  the 2014 World Cup. Brazil lost 7:1, five of  the goals coming within half  an hour of  kick-off. 
 It is important when testing one’s intuitions against these kinds of  case-comparisons that one 
compare “like with like”. There are innumerably many factors determining the affective profile and 
perceived significance of  any one event. These factors influence the depth and longevity of  our 
emotional responses to it, often in ways not obvious to introspection. These include, but are not 
limited to, our spatiotemporal proximity to the event, our ties to those involved, how engaged we and 
our wider communities are to the circumstances to which the events relate, and so forth. The 
observation that we recover quickly from a sporting tragedy would only be evidence for SMB if  the 
following holds (a) we recover slowly following non-make-believe tragedies and (b) these tragedies 
have similar affective profiles to the sporting tragedies with which we compare them. It will do no 
good, for instance, to point out that we recover quickly following defeat in an impromptu game of  
Noughts-and-Crosses, but recover slowly on hearing that our sibling’s house has burned down; the 
two events have drastically different affective profiles. One must also take care making these 
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 comparisons, since whether the affective profiles of  two events are comparable is informed by 
judgements about the extent to which make-believe might plausibly play a role in attitudes about those 
events. This is because how quickly people typically recover from the events in question is precisely 
the kind of  datum used to determine both (a) whether SMB applies to the event, and (b) how 
significant the event is. Quick recovery can be taken to show that event 1 matters less to the agent 
than event 2, from which there is no quick recovery, and that thus events 1 and 2 are not comparable. 
Alternatively, one can point to the quick recovery as evidence of  the agent’s engaging in make-believe, 
thus restoring the comparability of  the two events’ affective profiles. Using such comparisons to 
adjudicate SMB’s plausibility, therefore, runs the risk of  vicious circularity. 
 Putting this difficulty to one side, and returning to the imagined objection that SMB’s proponents 
might raise, it is unclear that a bad story on the evening news will continue to affect us any more than 
a comparable sporting tragedy. Certainly, if  a team I loosely follow loses a regular match, I will easily 
put this out of  my mind. But similarly, if  a country with which I am vaguely familiar suffers a small 
misfortune, this will not continue to affect me much either, even if  it ought to. Moreover, while it is 
true that bad news that is ‘close to home’ will often continue to move me, this is clearly true of  some 
sports outcomes, too. I have a friend around whom, a year after the event, I dared not speak of  the 
Vancouver Canucks’ defeat to the Boston Bruins in the Stanley Cup final. For me, Germany’s 5-1 
defeat at the hands of  England in 2001 is something I still wish had turned out differently, even if  the 
game was only a World Cup qualifier. The extent to which my friend and I consider these defeats 
“philosophically” is only the extent to which one might consider any setback with which one has 
“made peace” in such terms. Of  course, these cases are not decisive because SMB employs an 
existential rather than a universal quantifier; the claim is that some sports participation involves make-
believe, not necessarily all. But these kinds of  cases do remind one that our relationships with sporting 
events are not always as easily distinguished from our relationships to other events as suggested. 
 A different objection a proponent of  SMB might offer is that the boundaries of  the class of  
activities falling under the make-believe analysis are hardly clear. Thus, it begs the question to claim 
that activities such as watching the news do not involve make-believe, and to use these activities to 
discredit SMB.75 Perhaps. But I think one can plausibly assume that certain activities (like watching the 
news) do not involve make-believe in any way relevant to the discussion. This is because presumably 
some activities must not involve make-believe in the relevant way. Otherwise, SMB would be almost 
                                            
75 Thanks to Derek Matravers for this objection. 
63
 vacuously true, and its proponents’ focus on competitive games arbitrary. Competitive games were 
supposed to present a particular puzzle; but if  make-believe of  the kind in question is almost 
everywhere, this would cease to be the case.76 
 A different datum the SMB proponent can point to is the notable similarity in how we reassure 
participants in both make-believe and competitive games: “it’s only a game” (Walton 2015, 75). 
However, on reflection, such consolations are not restricted to competitive and make-believe domains. 
Imagine: two friends get out of  a taxi. After a few steps, one begins frantically patting herself  down, 
searching for the thank you card she was delivering, containing £100. She realizes, panicked, that it 
must have slipped out of  her pocket in the cab. Both turn, crying out for the taxi to stop, only to see 
it turn a corner, out of  sight. Seeing her friend despondent, the second remarks, “Oh well, it’s only 
money”, prompting a resigned sigh. Now imagine two friends at a bar. The first gazes tearfully into 
his beer, as he contemplates his recent break-up. “Come on”, says the second, “don’t cry over a girl!”. 
Or take two colleagues at an award ceremony. One, nominated for the Grand Prize, listens with giddy 
anticipation as the winner is announced. She does not win. Her colleague, seeing her friend’s 
disappointment, chimes in: “Cheer up! It’s only a stupid award!”. It is not just estimations of  
importance or value that invite such remarks either. Judgements about how appropriate attitudes and 
emotions are invite them too: “Don’t be scared, it’s just a spider”, “Don’t be angry, it’s just a small 
setback”, etc. Clearly, consolations of  the form “it’s just a story” occur in numerous contexts as 
plausibly devoid of  make-believe as any. 
 Of  course, the SMB proponent has a response: the spectator is caught up in the make-believe that 
the game’s outcome is important, and the consolation functions by shaking her out of  her pretence, 
as it were, and returning her to reality. In cases like the ones in my examples, however, the consolation 
merely reminds the sufferer of  the “bigger picture”—that the object of  her concern is less significant 
than she thinks. In other words, the consolation reminds the sport spectator, as the story-listener, to 
move from one world back to another, whereas, in the other cases, it merely corrects an incorrect 
belief, or value-judgement.77 
 Is the response persuasive? Whether one finds it persuasive depends in large part on one’s position 
on SMB. But, as this is the very view in contention, one cannot rely on one’s position on pain of  
                                            
76 Thanks to Sarah Buss for helping me see the force of  this reply. 
77 Another possibility is that consoling the story-listener might be part of  the game being played. If  so, the consoling 
friend would fictionally be correcting a false belief, or value-judgement. 
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 begging the question. Still, it is worth acknowledging that the SMB proponent has some response to 
the criticism. 
 
*  *  * 
 
If  abandoning SMB seems unattractive, the alternatives are given by A and B1, above. On A, one bites 
the bullet and extends SMB to my examples. One philosopher’s ponens is another’s tollens, as they say. 
On B, one identifies a theoretically relevant difference between my examples and the competitive game 
cases. I do not know of  such a difference, although nothing I have said rules it out. At minimum, I 
have offered a burden-shifting argument in §§2.1 and 2.2 for SMB advocates to identify what that 
difference is. 
 
  2.3 Competitive Games with Mimetic Content 
A different consideration that might lend plausibility to SMB is that many competitive games—chess, 
whack-a-mole, video games—are representational in a way that clearly involves make-believe. 
However, I think on further consideration, the mimetic elements in these games are orthogonal to 
their being competitive. To see this, it is instructive to consider certain bona fide sports and conjecture 
as to their origins by performing a little armchair anthropology. 
 Many sports must have been developed with a clear use of  make-believe. Fencing, for example, 
has its roots in recreational swordfighting. And recreational swordfighting, might have begun as a 
method to prepare warriors for fighting of  the more real, life-threatening kind. Wrestling, archery, and 
shooting, might also have functioned as preparation for violent combat as much as recreation. 
Plausibly, many of  these activities would have begun as simulations incorporating make-believe for 
the development of  “real-world” skill-sets. Swordfighters might have imagined engaging in real duels, 
wrestlers in real fights, and archers in real attempts to shoot their enemy. 
 But though these simulative origins may appear to support SMB, once one considers what is 
required for such simulations to become full-fledged sports, this appearance fades. Gradually, perhaps 
even instantly, these proto-athletes would have learned that the value of  their simulations was not 
merely parasitic on the activities they simulated; they would have come to value, enjoy, and seek out 
the activities for their own sake. Thought would have been devoted to refining the competition itself, 
with the introduction of  rules and conventions to define courses of  action available to the 
competitors. 
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  It is this moment, I suggest, at which the original element of  make-believe, the simulation of  real-
world activity, becomes merely ancillary to the activity. The competitors’ sense of  which actions are 
appropriate is no longer guided by the principles of  generation of  a make-believe game (that they are 
“fighting to the death”, or “shooting an enemy”, or whatever). Instead, their actions are guided by 
fixed rules that determine not only how the game can be won, but also which means to victory are 
permissible. Think of  two children playing a make-believe game of  swordfighting with small planks. 
In the heat of  “battle” one may grab the other’s “sword” and throw it aside or use the breadth of  the 
“blade” to “scoop dirt” into the other’s eyes. Any of  these activities count as playing the game because 
they make sense given the operative principle of  generation—that the planks are swords and the 
children swordfighters. Likewise, the proto-athletes, simulating a real fight, might have allowed 
themselves such improvisational flourishes as sword-grabbing and dirt-scooping (perhaps even where 
there was no actual dirt), supposing the object of  the simulation to be to ‘defeat’ the opponent by 
whatever means necessary.78 Fencers, by contrast, enjoy no such liberties. They are playing a sport 
whose object is to meet a stipulated success condition without flouting any of  the stipulated rules. 
The fact that their instruments resemble swords and that they engage in “lunges” and “attacks” is only 
of  anthropological or sports-historical interest. It tells one little about what they are doing qua 
competitors. 
 Another game may help drive this point home. Chess looks like the perfect example of  a 
competitive game suffused with make-believe. A chessboard is effectively a pretend battle field for 
two advancing armies. The pieces are all clearly politically and militarily representational; there are 
pawns (foot soldiers), knights, bishops, rooks (these typically look like fortifications), Kings, and 
Queens. And their strengths as pieces more or less fit their rank (the King is the obvious exception, 
though perhaps one is to imagine that he is past his prime). But this layer of  make-believe is quite 
superfluous to the game. One could easily substitute non-representational pieces, like those used in 
draughts, while remaining otherwise identical. If  anything, the nature of  the chess pieces may establish 
what Walton calls a “prop-oriented game”. These are games in which our interest is drawn to the 
props themselves rather than the fictional content of  the “game-world” (Walton 1993). The mimetic 
content helps one distinguish pieces in a way that is unnecessary in draughts. Still, this has no bearing 
                                            
78 Of  course, some rules might have been introduced to encourage a certain type of  skill to be utilized. Had the army 
general known that there would be no dirt or sand at the next battle, he might have prohibited dirt-scooping during 
practice to better prepare his warriors, for instance. This might then constitute a hybrid game—part simulation, part 
sport; there’s no reason to think that a game must be entirely one or the other. 
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 on whether chess or similar games involve make-believe in the respect intended by SMB—qua 
competitive games.79 
 There is a further issue concerning the normative force of  rules chosen and sustained more or 
less arbitrarily by players of  competitive games. And here, make-believe may play a role. It is the issue 
of  what it even means to say a player “can’t” perform a certain action, or that she “should not” break 
a rule—questions concerning the semantics of  deontic modals. One nominalist response to these 
questions is that this normative language describes a useful fiction in which rightness, goodness, 
correctness, etc. exist. This is the position, or one variant of  it, known as ‘fictionalism’.80 Yet, though 
the whole world may, if  fictionalism is right, be engaged in a kind of  elaborate make-believe game by 
talking normatively, this sort of  make-believe is not relevant to SMB, since it would render any norm-
governed practice an occasion for make-believe. 
 
  2.4 Reasons to Care 
It is clear that competitive games and traditional fictions typically differ in their representational 
content. While novels, plays and representational paintings, for instance, supply us with rich fictional 
“worlds”, the same is not ordinarily true of  sports.81 On Walton’s account of  fictionality, p is fictional 
in a work w, or w-fictional, just in case one ought to imagine p in the relevant context in order to fully 
appreciate w, should the question arise (Walton 1990, 39-41, 57-61). Which propositions are sports-
game-x-fictional? The propositions true in the fiction, if  any, are more or less the same propositions 
true of  the contest at the actual world. In other words, the fictional world of  the sports game is almost 
fully coincident with the actual world of  the sports event. This phenomenon of  coincidence, between 
fictional worlds and the actual one, is common enough; War and Peace makes it fictional that there is a 
country called Russia, which is invaded by Napoleon and so forth, all of  which is or was true of  the 
actual world. But, evidently, competitive games are not representational in the same way War and Peace 
is. The players do not “stand for” characters, as an image of  Orson Welles stands for the character 
Charles Foster Kane (or two-dimensional screen projections stand for Orson Welles). Or consider 
“Pro-Wrestling”. When WWF wrestler Bret “the Hitman” Hart takes to the stage and addresses the 
                                            
79 I suppose a fencer, for instance, might pretend to be a sword-fighter in order to perform better. This could work in 
something like the way that an actor might improve her performance by pretending to be the character she is playing. 
But this certainly is not necessary, or even central, to fencing or sport generally. Nor, as I will show, can this kind of  
make-believe plausibly confirm SMB. 
80 For more on fictionalism in normative discourse, see (Joyce, 2001) and (Kalderon, 2005). 
81 As I have just shown, some sports may incorporate representational elements; on this, see (Wertz 1985, 15-16). 
67
 crowd, Bret Hart really takes to the stage and addresses the crowd, or speaks at any rate. Yet, it is always 
apparent that Bret Hart is playing a kind of  send-up of  himself, a fictional counterpart who “fights” 
his wrestling “opponents”. Compare this with tennis, say. When Serena Williams serves an ace, she 
really serves an ace. There is seemingly no more to it. 
 Appearances can be deceptive, however, and one cannot expect participation in make-believe to 
always be transparent to experience. And where a fictional world is almost identical to the actual world, 
one can only presume that it will be harder still to separate what one engages in literally from what 
one engages in as part of  a game of  make-believe. According to SMB, the fictional world one engages 
with in participating in a competitive game differs from the actual world in that the outcome of  the 
game is incredibly important, or at least more important than is actually the case (Walton 2015, 78). 
This will derivatively make any events causally related to the outcome (individual tackles, shots, 
refereeing decisions etc.) more important in turn. 
 A worry with this proposal is that it appears to raise a puzzle as perplexing as the apparent one it 
is intended to solve. The old puzzle is this: how can we care about something we do not believe 
matters—i.e. CGOs? The new puzzle: how does this kind of  make-believe motivate the behaviour 
SMB is intended to explain? Consider fictions of  the more ordinary kind. In reading a comic, for 
instance, one might cheer on Superman and wish ill upon Lex Luther. There is nothing terribly 
perplexing about this. Admiring Superman and despising Lex Luther makes sense given that Superman 
is a good guy trying to save the world and Lex Luther is a vain plutocrat bent on evil. In the case of  
sport, things are different; there is no fictional world that makes sense of  participants’ responses, or 
rather, what fictional world there is that might explain the CGO’s importance is the same as the actual 
world. There are no “facts” in the fiction that could rationalize our attitudes towards the game’s 
outcome beyond the actual facts that could. How, then, does positing such a fictional world help explain 
our apparently incoherent attitudes towards CGOs? As Walton notes, “there are no ready-made good 
guys and bad guys in sports”. He continues: 
 
[S]ports fans are free to choose for themselves; each has his or her own personal heroes and 
villains. [...] you are not getting anything wrong if  you root for the Tigers instead of  the Blue Jays, 
or the Blue Jays instead of  the Tigers. If  your choice suffers miserably in the competition, you 
may regard the event as something of  a tragedy [...] but for the other fans it will have a wonderful 
happy ending. Tragedy is in the eyes of  the beholding fan. (Walton 2015, 80) 
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 Typically, then, there is no fact of  the matter in the fictional world of  the game to determine which 
teams or outcomes deserve our support. Granting this, how is it that anyone manages to “care” about 
any of  the teams or outcomes at all—not merely make it fictional that one cares, but enough to move 
one to the heights of  enthusiasm SMB is meant to explain? One possible answer is that sports 
participants treat certain insufficient reasons as sufficient ones for cheering one way rather than the 
other; that is, while the “workworld”, if  there is one, of  the competitive game does not offer facts 
about who to support, the “gameworld” of  the participant does.82 Such reasons might be that a team’s 
jersey is heroic, that we dislike the way a team plays, or that we share a name with a competitor. In the 
event that we are ourselves competing, this fact may by itself  function as the reason. This raises a 
further question. If  we (fictionally) treat weak reasons as strong ones, or even non-reasons as reasons, 
why are typically not more creative in this endeavour? It is interesting that spectators do not pretend 
(in “normal” sports participation at least), for instance, that their team must win to avert nuclear 
disaster, or being shot, or to secure world peace. If  sports spectatorship really were a game of  make-
believe, it seems such interest-enhancing imaginings might be warranted, even commonplace. The 
details of  gameworlds embellished in this way would (fictionally) give one reason to prefer certain 
outcomes over others. 
 
  2.5 Any Old Make-believe? 
It is worth considering an uncontroversial example of  using a competitive game to engage in make-
believe in order to see how it differs, if  at all, from the kind of  make-believe just appealed to. At times, 
when stuck in an airport for instance, I find myself  watching a football match between two teams I 
barely know, one of  whom is playing in black and white (Germany’s colours). So, I amuse myself  
momentarily by pretending that Germany (a team I support) is playing, provoking a mild make-believe 
interest in the game that was otherwise absent. But sustaining this imaginative project is difficult and, 
in any case, never arouses the same passions that really watching Germany play affords. I think it is 
clear that this kind of  make-believe game does not confirm SMB, since it is the kind of  make-believe 
game one could play with any event or object at all (because, in principle, anything could be deployed 
as a prop and combined with any principle of  generation to generate any fictional truth whatsoever).83 
                                            
82 The terms ‘workworld’ and ‘gameworld’ are Walton’s. A workworld is the set of  propositions made fictional by a 
work. A participant’s gameworld is the set of  propositions made fictional by a participant’s interaction with a work, 
where this will standardly include all the things made fictional by that work. See (Walton 1990, 58-63). 
83 It is for this reason that I am unsure what evidential weight to give comments friendly competitors make to each 
other in jest. Walton points to cases in which one player might say to the other “You rat!” or ask “What did I do to 
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 So call this kind of  non-SMB-confirming make-believe illegitimate make-believe, as opposed to the 
legitimate kind that would confirm SMB. Now one can ask: how do legitimate and illegitimate make-
believe differ? 
 SMB relies on the possibility that one can choose one’s favoured teams and players for inadequate 
reasons—even “on whims” (Walton 2015, 76). However, it is more plausible that one must have some 
positive (and actual) reason to opt for one rather than the other. In addition to CGOs that arrest us, 
there are others that fail to pique our interest at all. Sometimes this is for reasons that explain 
comparable failures in appreciating traditional fictions. A film, say, might fail to get one to care about 
what happens because it is poorly put together, has wooden acting, a dull narrative, etc. This does not 
establish that the film is not a work of  fiction. It merely shows that it is not a good work of  fiction. But 
the case with sports seems different. I may exhibit intense caring attitudes towards the outcome of  a 
game between Germany and Spain, while failing do so with respect to the outcome of  a Barcelona v 
Real Madrid match. Yet this discrepancy is not (always) explicable by appeal to the quality of  the two 
matches, or other details of  the matches that parallel a film’s production, acting, and narrative. The 
matches might involve an equal amount of  incident, have an equal number of  interpersonal rivalries, 
and so forth. And yet it might still be the case that one engages me while the other does not. How 
does one explain this? The obvious answer for most cases is that there is a salient difference—namely, 
that I am a Germany fan and not a Barcelona fan, or that I am from Germany and not from Madrid 
or Barcelona, or that I have friends who are German but not friends who are Catalonian or Madrileño. 
These are the kinds of  facts from which fans are born. But notice that these all look like actual reasons 
for preferring one team’s victory over the other. They are comparable to the reasons one has for 
preferring that one’s own child win a prize over another’s child. If  asked why one has this preference, 
what is one to say? “It’s my child!” counts as good an explanatory reason as any (even if  it is not 
universally normative).84 At least, this reply does not only fictionally report the parent’s reason. The 
alternative, that one merely fictionally has reasons—perhaps one imagines one is from Barcelona, or 
that severe consequences proceed from a defeat—just looks like the illegitimate kind of  make-believe 
I engage in when I imagine some non-German team is Germany. It is important that the SMB 
                                            
deserve this?” etc. in the course of  a friendly competitive game (Walton 2015, 82-83). This kind of  banter certainly 
involves make-believe. But because this kind of  banter can be superimposed onto any activity whatsoever, the 
question arises whether this banter is part of  what we are trying to explain, or simply an ancillary form of  make-
believe competitors sometimes engage in (much like the military make-believe of  chess), and a very general one at 
that. 
84 I intend ‘my’ here at the level of  content rather than character; it is less plausible to think everyone has an obligation 
to care about my (i.e. Nils’) child’s success, although she is very cute. 
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 proponent have a way to distinguish the illegitimate from legitimate kinds of  make-believe, in the 
sense intended. The former would count as very tame proof  of  the truth of  SMB; but if  it cannot be 
distinguished from the latter, tame proof  will be all there is. 
 
  2.6 Authenticity 
A final consideration that challenges SMB is that it is important in sport that players really try. In this 
respect, sport is very different from theatre or film, say, in which the actors are expected to dissemble. 
In cases where players feign effort, or play toward a pre-arranged outcome, participant interest 
disappears (or changes entirely).85 This is why sport-lovers so detest match-fixing. Match-fixing 
scandals damage the integrity of  sports not merely by being deceitful, but because they undermine the 
authenticity of  the spectacle. I suggest that this explains why “sports” whose outcomes are known to 
be predetermined must be integrally supplemented with other forms of  entertainment to make them 
watchable. In Pro-Wrestling, for instance, elaborate soap-stories hold the various “fights” together. 
The Harlem Globetrotters must incorporate freakish feats of  skill, pranks, and the use of  non-
regulation props such as trampolines to generate interest in their games. This supplementation is 
needed in the same way that a broader narrative is needed to sustain interest in more traditional 
fictional sporting encounters (e.g. the Rocky film series). This need for authenticity is interesting for 
my purposes precisely because nothing comparably authentic is (ordinarily) required to enjoy 
traditional fictions. If  sports participation involved make-believe, one would expect authenticity to be 
irrelevant to one’s ability to get behind a competitor. This suggests that our relation to sports differs 
psychologically and affectively from our relation to conventional fictions.  
 A possible response is that what fictionally the spectator cares about is that her team or competitor 
actually wins a genuinely contested encounter. However, this just looks like a restatement of  the 
difference between sports participation and engagement with traditional fictions that I have identified. 
And as it does not explain why sports spectators require authenticity, whereas fans of  traditional fiction 
do not, the restatement is dialectically unhelpful. A different response is to contend that traditional 
fictions and make-believe games do require authenticity. Many make-believe games involve props that 
play an important, if  not essential, role in generating fictional truths. A child that merely tells her 
playmates to “imagine the car crashes into the wall” in lieu of  actually guiding the toy car into the 
cereal box, or a sadomasochist “top” who merely tells the “bottom” that she is whipping him, rather 
                                            
85 Former US tennis star, Andy Roddick captured this nicely in a post-match interview: “There is no script in sports, 
you know. I think that is what makes it the best entertainment in the world.” (Telegraph, 2012) 
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 than actually doing it, probably fails at something important to the others’ make-believe. Are these 
comparable cases of  inauthenticity? In some respects, yes, but they still strike me as importantly 
different; the analogue to these cases is not authentic competition—competitors really trying—but 
rather “competitors” really acting out the “competition” as the Harlem Globetrotters do, instead of  
merely describing their doing so or utilizing props in some other way. Yet, what the Globetrotters do 
is not authentic in the same sense that genuine competition is. 
 The SMB proponent can also appeal to competitive games that rely predominantly, even 
exclusively, on chance to question the importance of  this kind of  authenticity. When two people wager 
on which raindrop will reach the windowsill first, or which “horse” will win a race determined by dice 
throws, talk of  authenticity is strained. Indeed, SMB strikes me as more plausible for these kinds of  
games, as opposed to full-fledged sports, which probably is no coincidence. 
 
 III. Alternative Accounts 
SMB faces some fairly serious difficulties, many of  which result from undercutting the puzzle SMB 
purportedly solves. That sport presents no special puzzle is a serious possibility. That said, the idea that 
something about our engagement with competitive games needs explaining is hard to shake, even if  
this oddness extends beyond engagement with such games. Competitive games do still elicit incredible 
excitement about events that seem trivial (consider kids racing to the next lamppost and so on). 
 My fear that accepting SMB commits one to embracing a similar analysis for lots of  other activities 
does not stem from a general scepticism about whether make-believe extends beyond works of  
traditional fiction or children’s make-believe games. I am thoroughly persuaded that make-believe is at 
the heart of  a number of  other practices, such as metaphor, irony, and mental simulation, and am 
sympathetic to fictionalist forms of  anti-realism about a number of  domains of  discourse couched in 
terms of  make-believe. Nor am I persuaded by some of  the sillier criticisms directed at make-believe 
theory in general. For instance, the fact that participants in competitive games do not think of  
themselves as engaged in make-believe, or that they “really feel” sad, happy, or whatever, is utterly 
unpersuasive evidence against the view.86 The chief  worry, to recall §§2.1 and 2.2, is that the make-
believe analysis threatens to overgeneralize to other activities that seem (I think obviously) not to 
involve make-believe. Such events—suffering an erratic radio signal during the broadcast of  a 
compelling anecdote, losing a parking spot, lunging for a falling cup, etc.—are continuous with or 
                                            
86  This kind of  criticism is levelled at Walton’s theory of  fiction in (Carroll, 1990, 74). 
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 identical to activities in which we care perfectly literally about something, but where our caring 
attitudes appear overcooked. And so, whatever explains this appearance here can explain them in the 
case of  competitive games. Given the additional worries raised in §§2.4-2.6, one is owed an argument 
for extending the make-believe analysis instead of  withholding it altogether. 
 
*  *  * 
 
If  one should reject SMB, then what are the alternatives? I consider two in the final section. The first 
proceeds from the assumption that there is something distinctive about our attitudes to CGOs. I assess 
whether these attitudes are explicable in terms of  play attitudes generally, rather than make-believe 
specifically. The second proceeds from the assumption that there is nothing distinctive about our 
attitudes towards CGOs, in that they are continuous with attitudes we exhibit toward more “ordinary” 
outcomes. I consider whether the appearance of  oddness that our attitudes towards all these outcomes 
exhibit can be explained in terms of  a general volatility of  our caring attitudes. I end by considering 
whether make-believe might still play a role in either of  these alternatives to SMB. 
 
  3.1 Play 
Let us suppose that there is something puzzling about our attitudes towards CGOs that demands 
explanation. This puzzle resembles another problem that has stubbornly persisted in the philosophy 
of  sport. This problem concerns reconciling the fact that we think sports (not just CGOs) are trivial 
with the fact that we confer so much importance on them. Randolph Feezell offers a nice gloss on 
this problem: 
 
It is a truism to note the widespread interest in, or perhaps we should say obsession with, sports. 
[...] Yet the involvement, indeed the obsession, with sport is paradoxical, since in most cases sports 
involve activities arbitrarily and artificially constructed for no apparent external purpose. In an 
important sense, sports do not really matter, yet we often participate in and view sports as if  
nothing mattered more (Feezell 2004, xi). 
 
One possibility is that this purported problem arises from a misconceived way of  looking at sport, 
which in turn stems from a misconceived way of  looking at play. Participating in sport is a form of  
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 play.87 And it is clear, on reflection, that the puzzle Feezell discusses is just one aspect of  a broader 
question about play. Just as Feezell says of  sport, likewise play does not really matter “in an important 
sense”. Indeed, interestingly, it is thought to be central to play that the purposes it serves be at best 
secondary considerations in the minds of  players. As one scholar of  play puts it, “if  its purpose is 
more important than the act of  doing it, it probably isn’t play” (Brown 2008). 
 It is this insight that offers a way of  undoing what is paradoxical about our interest in play. When 
one tries to understand play as one understands other instrumental activities, paradox emerges. These 
activities, whether grocery shopping or booking a doctor’s appointment, serve fundamentally as means 
to other ends. Understanding them consists in discovering which ends they serve, and whether these 
ends deserve our consideration. But play, qua play, is not undertaken as a means to some further end. 
Play is its own end. Michael Novak expresses this sentiment poetically: 
 
Play, not work, is the end of  life. To participate in the rites of  play is to dwell in the Kingdom of  
Ends. To participate in work, career, and the making of  history is to labor in the Kingdom of  
Means. The modern age, the age of  history, nourishes illusion. In a Protestant culture, as in Marxist 
cultures, work is serious, important, adult. Its essential significance is overlooked. Work, of  course, 
must be done, but we should be wise enough to distinguish necessity from reality. Play is reality, 
work is diversion and escape (Novak 1976, 40). 
 
While one need not endorse Novak’s complete inversion of  the importance of  work and play, his 
description of  play as the “Kingdom of  Ends” and practical life as the “Kingdom of  Means” provides 
a useful metaphor for understanding play. To try to understand play as one understands practical 
activities is to misplace it in the Kingdom of  Means. And the same is true of  sport, insofar as it is a 
form of  play. Play belongs in the Kingdom of  Ends, and will not make much sense until one puts it 
there. 
 The original puzzle, assuming there is one, might rest on a similar mistake. The puzzle, and thus 
SMB, is motivated by contemplating CGOs through an instrumental lens. Consider again this passage 
from Walton, for instance: 
 
                                            
87 Actually, sport can be just business. In these cases, it is questionable whether sports even count as play. But, it is 
precisely the uncontaminated sports participation—the participation that is not just business that is of  interest. This 
kind of  sports participation is play. For more on these distinctions see (Suits 1988) and (Schneider, 2001). 
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 Why should people care about the Yankees or the Red Sox? Their fortunes on the field have no obvious 
bearing on the welfare of  most fans. Why does it matter whether the home team wins or loses? Life will 
go on afterwards just as it did before, regardless. But the spectators, some of  them, scream their hearts 
out during the game, as though it is a matter of  life or death. [...] Are fans irrational? Do they believe, 
falsely but sincerely, that it really is a matter of  life and death? (Walton 2015, 76-77) (emphasis 
added) 
 
The thought is that if  the screaming fans do not believe the desired outcome will lead to any real 
benefit and are rational then their behaviour is puzzling. The current proposal is that this inference is 
made more plausible by an inappropriately instrumental view of  participation in competitive games. 
If  play’s importance is reduced to its contribution to external ends, its emotional force and interest 
will remain mysterious. This point also applies to the thought that play (and sport) is essentially a 
means to pleasure. Randolph Feezell addresses this point: 
 
Play is enjoyed for its own sake, but the enjoyment or pleasure that arises when participating in 
playful activities supervenes on the activity. The end is not the pleasure or enjoyment or “fun”, 
separate from the activity. A view of  sport that stresses play is not reduced to hedonism. That 
would be yet another form of  reductionism that reduces sport to something else that is good 
(Feezell 2004, xiii-xiv). 
 
Feezell over-creams the coffee a little. We frequently do engage in play because it will be pleasurable, 
and it will often be hard to tell exactly whether pleasure is a motivating end or mere side-effect. But 
the germ of  truth here is that pleasure is not necessary for our engaging, or desiring to engage, in play. 
Play can be exploratory, whimsical, arbitrary, and frequently need not elicit any great degree of  pleasure 
if  any. To repeat the earlier point, play is an autotelic activity that supplies its own motivating end, even 
if  there are additional motivating ends, such as its concomitant pleasures.88 Some heightened emotional 
responses we experience in participating in sports will, I suggest, be left unexplained by means-ends 
analyses. In play, and so in sport, we often jump, cheer and scream for no practical reason. Why we play 
in this way is another question—one for anthropologists, evolutionary biologists, or neuroscientists, I 
suspect. 
                                            
88 This view of  play is one endorsed by a number of  scholars of  play. See, for instance, (Brown, 2008), (Huizinga, 
1938/2003, 7), (Kretchmar, 2007, 2-3), (Morgan, 2007) and (Suits 1988, 2). 
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  Of  course, SMB appeals to play: make-believe play. So how does this proposal differ from SMB? 
Make-believe is only one species of  play. Therefore, while engagement with sport typically involves 
play, this does not entail that it typically involves make-believe. I do not profess to be able to lay out a 
complete taxonomy of  the various types of  play, nor offer a fully worked out theory as to what relates 
and distinguishes them. However, that there are many types of  play other than make-believe is, on 
reflection, quite obvious. The Institute for Play recognizes at least seven main types (NIfP 2009).89 
Animal play is one example, though animals themselves exhibit many different kinds of  play, at least 
some of  which should not be confused with make-believe. There is also the kind of  play that is 
exhibited through the creative arts, as well as physical “body” play. Often, when we create music or 
paint, for instance, we are engaged in a kind of  play that need not involve make-believe. Juggling, 
picking flowers, splashing bath water, skimming stones, whistling a tune, dancing, blowing bubbles, 
sculpting—all of  these activities typically involve different forms of  play that do not necessarily, or 
even typically, involve make-believe. 
 Two caveats. First, this proposal is susceptible to some of  the worries about SMB. In particular, 
there remains an apparent continuity between our interest in CGOs and other more “ordinary” 
activities. Acknowledging the puzzle and appealing to play stand at odds with this continuity. That 
said, the proposal is at least no worse off  than SMB. And insofar as it appeals to a broader set of  play 
attitudes, it becomes more probable that it successfully explains some of  these ordinary activities. 
Second, even accepting that the proposal provides a framework for dismissing SMB, it clearly does 
not show that SMB is false by itself. There surely are kinds of  play that do not involve make-believe, 
but this mere fact does not show that participation in competitive games is among them. The SMB 
proponent has a good story to tell about a kind of  play, or the kind, that competitive games involve. 
In playing sports one might behave as though one were invested in its outcome. What does it mean 
to behave as though this were the case? A natural answer is: Make-believe. SMB is still subject to the 
objections I have advanced, of  course. And there are other kinds of  play that involve passionate 
immersion in some activity, which might explain the ‘as though’ (the kind of  creative play we engage 
in when designing a room or learning an instrument, for instance, or the physical play we engage in 
when cliff-diving or dancing, both of  which might involve make-believe but need not). Assuming any 
kind of  play is explanatory here, there may also be cases where it is too difficult to say which kind is 
                                            
89 Though, I suspect these means of  dividing play into types may cut across more philosophically interesting distinctions, 
just as distinguishing flowers by their colours cuts across more interesting biological distinctions. 
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 operative in a competitive game participant. More radically, it may even be that in some cases, there is 
just no fact of  the matter. 
 
 3.2 Volatile Attitudes 
A different proposal begins by denying that there is any puzzle to begin with. This suggests that what 
explains our behaviour when participating with competitive games is something general—or more 
general—across a range of  activities in which we participate. One possibility is that our motivational 
attitudes, including what I have called our “caring-attitudes”, are more volatile than the apparent 
puzzle suggests. On this line, when someone is caught up in some activity, including competitive 
games, the things they care about experience a more or less violent shift. Different contexts can cause 
certain motivational attitudes to become salient, or grant us completely new concerns. Competitive 
games, if  we let them, can supply such contexts. One way to account for the discrepancy between our 
sober proclamations about a CGO’s importance and the extent to which those outcomes move us as 
participants, then, is to appeal to the volatility and context-sensitivity of  our motivational attitudes. 
 Attitudinal volatility is familiar on reflection. In addition to the examples from §§2.1 and 2.2, 
adherence to popular fads, concern for others present and others absent, and passing flirtations with 
new hobbies all seem to exhibit the phenomenon. Sexual desire is like this for many people. One has 
to get “in the mood” and when one is, it can be as though little or nothing else matters. If  the moment 
passes without gratification, so eventually will the mood and with it the intense orientation of  one’s 
motivational attitudes. But the phenomenon goes beyond the bedroom. Some of  these cases exemplify 
straight irrationality (sexual desire might be such a case), but not all. Take a political activist who works 
for months agitating against the passage of  some proposed legislation. After time, she drops out of  
the activist world because of  new responsibilities. Later, after the vote, she does not even know 
whether the bill became law. Does this show that the concern was insincere, or the product of  
irrationality? Only if  one has implausible demands built into one’s theory of  sincerity or rationality. 
Participating in sport exhibits a similar attitudinal volatility. For a brief  moment, or several seasons, a 
sports participant comes to care about a relatively narrowly-focussed set of  outcomes, unencumbered 
by questions about whether these outcomes are ultimately justified by the ends to which they are 
connected, let alone some final end. Later, she ceases to care, or care as much. 
 One intriguing possibility is that our ability and tendency to focus our concern in this way might 
be (an evolutionarily adaptive) trait built into the very architecture of  human action and affect. Indeed, 
one can mobilize a kind of  transcendental argument for its necessity to human investment. If  many 
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 people have no idea of  a final substantive end or ends (to adopt an Aristotelian picture of  practical 
normativity), and yet also care about and take the means towards goals, then it cannot be a requirement 
of  an agent’s performing an action, or caring about something, that she do these under the description 
of  serving some substantive final end, explicit or implicit; I say ‘substantive’, because agency might 
require a belief  that one acts, or an intention to act, toward an un(der)specified ‘good’.90 This suggests 
that the teleological story we bear in mind when we act or feel concern is often a more or less truncated 
one; the substantive ends are only a few links in the justificatory chain removed from the action being 
undertaken. The CGOs we care about, and the means toward them, are cases in which this truncation 
reaches its lowest limits; the CGOs are only one or two degrees—or where there is no further end, no 
degrees—removed from the ends toward which we take them to contribute. This explains why caring 
about CGOs strikes us as more paradoxical than caring in typical cases. In typical cases, such as 
meeting my boss’ deadline, the chain of  means and justificatory ends is more protracted. Why should 
I care about meeting my boss’s deadline? Because otherwise the shipment will not be processed on 
time. Why should I care about that? Because otherwise the delivery will not be made. Why should I 
care about that? Because it will jeopardize the company’s relationship to the customer? Why should I 
care about that? Because this increases the probability that the customer will take her patronage 
elsewhere. And so on. This chain of  justifications (actually, more likely a web), will peter out 
somewhere, who knows where? Whereas, in the sporting case it peters out obviously and immediately, or 
almost immediately. This makes caring about the outcome appear more obviously bizarre and arbitrary. 
 Why should an abrupt chain of  justificatory reasons seem more absurd than a long one? In his 
now famous article on “the Absurd” (Nagel 1971), Thomas Nagel describes the “backward step” we 
are able to perform when we reflect on the significance of  a particular situation. A situation will seem 
absurd when pretension and reality clash, as, to use Nagel’s example, when someone’s trousers fall 
down as he is knighted. When we reflect on our individual endeavours, as we frequently do, we often 
take this backward step to a vantage point from which we examine and assess the point of  the 
endeavour as a whole. One’s job for instance, may be important from the perspective of  the 
corporation’s well-being. But one can also consider whether the corporation itself  serves a legitimate 
purpose, thereby reflecting on the point of  one’s job from “further back”. In the ordinary case, the 
assessment is done against a particular standard for what makes such an endeavour significant or 
                                            
90 It might be that the volatility of  our caring-attitudes is partly explained by our ability to act and care without appeal 
to final ends. The idea is that to the extent that I undertake many, if  not all, of  my projects without seeing how they 
serve some substantive final end, those projects are susceptible to being abandoned or rekindled in surprisingly 
volatile ways (think again of  the political activist). 
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 worthwhile. One can think of  this as a kind of  zooming out process on a chain of  justificatory reasons, 
each backward step allowing us to see increasingly more ultimate reasons, at least as one takes them 
to be. Nearing its limit, this process will bring one to the grandest purposes against which one can 
judge an endeavour’s significance, such as “service to society, the state, the revolution, the progress of  
history, the advance of  science, or religion and the glory of  God” (Nagel 1971, p 720). Where a 
situation or endeavour in which one is seriously invested falls short according to a grander standard 
of  significance revealed by such a backward step, one is faced with absurdity. This standard reveals 
how one’s motivational attitudes outstrip the importance of  their objects. But, in addition to these 
ordinary backward steps, one can also take the process to its extraordinary conclusion by taking what, 
in the spirit of  Nagel’s discussion, one might call the philosophical backward step. This is the backward 
step one takes when one questions the ultimate standards by questioning it all and seeing it “with that 
detached amazement which comes from watching an ant struggle up a heap of  sand” (Nagel 2013, 
720). What differentiates this backward step from the others is that it reveals no further standards of  
significance, just that there is no further standard and that nothing outside the whole package of  life 
and its endeavours can justify it; the package has to justify itself; everything and nothing appears equally 
meaningful, or meaningless. Yet, despite our seeing things from this dizzying skeptical vantage point, 
we remain just as invested in the projects it surveys anyway. And herein lies the profoundest kind of  
absurdity: not in the juxtaposition of  a seriously undertaken endeavour and standards of  which it falls 
short, but in an inescapable juxtaposition between all seriously undertaken endeavours and no standard 
at all. 
 Our investment in CGOs is susceptible to a similar “backward step” to standards of  seriousness 
from which it falls short. This begins to explain the appearance of  absurdity and paradox. My 
suggestion is that this explanation is completed by the observation that only one or two such backward 
steps is required to bring this particular investment into doubt. Thus, caring about CGOs more easily 
strikes one as absurd in the way that, ultimately, any activity is. This suggestion yields an interesting, 
and I think correct, prediction. Ceteris paribus, caring about CGOs embedded into larger structures of  
CGOs (and other outcomes) to which they relate as means and end will strike us as less absurd than 
doing so towards CGOs that stand alone. The idea is that, for instance, scoring points in order to win 
a game, in order to win a league, in order to qualify for a playoff, in order to become a Champion, etc., 
and caring about doing this will seem less obviously absurd than caring comparably about merely 
scoring a single point for no further end. 
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  My suggestion is not that our motivational attitudes freely appear and disappear. This is not the 
only way to capture the psychology behind volatile motivational attitudes. It is consistent with this 
volatility that the attitudes remain fixed where they are in our psychological economy, but become 
more or less behaviourally influential in different contexts. David Velleman describes the possibility 
that this volatility be explained by a form of  meta-desire for one’s actions to “make sense”, the desire 
being to accommodate one’s behaviour in a running narrative of  the self. On this picture, the attitudes 
that explain one’s caring do not disappear so much as take a back seat while other attitudes are 
“reinforced by the agent’s conception of  what he is doing”. (Velleman 2002, 97-98). The desire to 
make sense of  what one is doing combines with a self-conception to promote or relegate one’s 
motivational attitudes to a guiding centre or an (at best) restraining periphery, respectively. But it does 
not thereby create or destroy these attitudes in the agent’s psyche; it just plays them up or down. 
Velleman gives the example of  a person pressing a point in argument. Insofar as the agent gets “carried 
away”, she conceives of  herself  exclusively as someone pressing a point (rather than as a polite human 
being, or conscientious colleague), and the attitudes that might otherwise motivate her to acknowledge 
her interlocutor’s annoyance are muted (but do not disappear). She has only two hopes in such a case, 
according to Velleman. The muted motives might act as “unreflective restraint” on action “from the 
outside”. Velleman pictures this as happening in something like the way my desire to avoid colliding 
with things constrains my actions when I rush down a crowded street, say. Alternatively, her other 
motivational attitudes—such as her desire to maintain good relations with colleagues—might 
“obtrude” themselves on her attention in such a way that she revises her self-conception by coming 
to see that she “has more than one end at stake”. 
 If  Velleman is right, then it suggests one attractive, if  highly metaphorical, way of  explaining our 
seemingly exaggerated interest in CGOs that need not appeal to make-believe. We adopt a self-
conception of  playing the game, supporting the team, being a winner, etc., however consciously or 
not. This self-conception combines with a desire to make sense of  our behaviour to put those attitudes 
that most chime with this self-conception (e.g. desires to cheer or try hard, or the disposition to feel 
the sting of  defeat) in the driving seat. Those attitudes that do not (e.g. desires to be fair, be a good 
parent, or whatever) are consigned to a restraining role—the role of  road signs and markings on the 
agential highway. This can work via the same means by which an agent adopts the self-conception of  
one who is pressing a point in argument, thereby emphasizing and de-emphasizing attitudes in her 
psychology. I think this is at least roughly what happens when we “get into” a competitive game. It 
also offers a psychological metaphor to complement the metaphor of  Nagel’s backward step. Taking 
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 a backward step reveals broader evaluative standards from which to consider a given goal, action, or 
practice. Adopting a less narrow self-conception allows a broader set of  attitudes to play a driving, 
rather than merely restraining role in action. 
 Velleman’s account rings true for at least one case I personally experienced involving a competitive 
game. In 2007, my brother and I, lifelong devotees of  the German national football team, attended a 
match in the newly built Wembley Stadium. The game was between old rivals, England and Germany. 
It’s hard to convey how significant matches between these two teams is for two Germans who grew 
up in England in the 90’s, when second World War xenophobia still trickled through the generations, 
compounded by years of  built up resentment (Germany knocked England out of  the World Cup in 
1970 and 1990, and the European Championship in 1972 and 1996) and the cruelty of  schoolchildren. 
In short, the game was momentous for us for a number of  reasons. And the game was momentous 
for the England fans too, with whom we were forced to sit. The game was in such demand that the 
only seats I could get were not with the high-paying middle-class fair-weather fans, nor with the 
travelling German support, but up in the rafters with England’s true working class supporters. Having 
been subjected to violence and abuse from England fans before because of  our German nationality, 
my brother and I spent the entire game on our guard, lest we give away our loyalties. When England 
scored the early opener, we defied our usual instincts by standing and applauding politely, (cursing 
under our breath). The fans around us, meanwhile, erupted, at one point even ruffling our hair, 
confused as to why we were not also jumping up and down for joy. When Germany eventually 
equalized and later scored the winner (predictably), we had to remain seated so as not to betray our 
elation. Something I will never forget about the game was how numb I was to its outcome by the end. 
We had been so focussed on our self-preservation that the match was drained of  most of  its 
significance for us. In Vellemanian terms, our self-conception was so overwhelmingly one of  being 
covert trespassers in genuinely dangerous territory, that those attitudes concerning the match’s 
outcome were entirely relegated to the periphery. 
 Is SMB finished then? Not quite. This is because, broadly speaking, the Vellemanian story is 
compatible with SMB. Among the ways one can adopt a self-conception is by using one’s imagination. 
Velleman gives the example of  a smoker who, unable to quit, imagines himself  full-time to be a non-
smoker, thereby adopting a self-conception as such, in order to facilitate turning down the next 
cigarette. The self-conception is false in this case, but places the agent’s non-smoker motivational 
attitudes in the foreground, making not smoking a matter of  “going on as normal” rather than 
interrupting a current (and satisfying) habit. The pangs of  withdrawal, meanwhile, come to be 
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 understood as irritations to be ignored rather than urges to smoke (Velleman 2002, 99-102). 
Eventually, all going to plan, the smoker becomes a non-smoker, rendering the once merely imagined 
self-conception true. In another paper, Walton describes the case of  the philosopher David Lewis, 
who claims to have imagined caring about a cricket team in order to cultivate a genuine interest in 
their fortunes over time (Walton 1994, 72, 72n), which bears obvious similarities to the smoker’s 
attempt to quit (there are differences, too).  
 Adopting a conception of  oneself  in imagination that foregrounds one’s motivational attitudes 
towards CGOs—in Lewis’ case (almost?) exclusively fictional motivational attitudes—may, therefore, 
explain our participatory behaviour towards them. Still, the explanation runs into the challenges I 
raised in §2. One might insist for these reasons that it is only to the extent that participants like David 
Lewis no longer have to imagine supporting their team that they legitimately do so (the imagining being 
an illegitimate form of  support as discussed in §3.4). Still, the SMB proponent can take solace in the 
fact that this discussion has revealed the beginnings of  an answer to at least one of  those challenges 
that was not available at the beginning of  the paper. If  the Vellemanian account of  David Lewis’ and 
the smoker’s attempts to alter their motivational attitudes is accurate, then the worry that SMB 
overgeneralizes is assuaged slightly. It might be far-fetched to claim that our interest in “ordinary” 
activities involves make-believe, but it is not far-fetched that some of  our literal interest in them might 
originate in this kind of  imaginative exercise, as the smoker’s case shows. 
 
 IV. Conclusion 
I began by teasing out the claim that participating in sport involves make-believe by building upon 
Walton’s suggestive paper. I showed how SMB relates to a loosely analogous solution to the so-called 
Puzzle of  Fiction, before identifying difficulties for the view. First, our apparently odd attitudes to 
CGOs are continuous with our attitudes toward a number of  more ordinary activities and ends that 
are not especially puzzling. Second, our apparently remarkable ability to recover from tragic CGOs is 
continuous with our ability to recover from ordinary tragedies. Both of  these difficulties suggest that 
SMB inadvertently overgeneralizes. Third, a prima facie plausible defence of  SMB that appeals to the 
mimetic content in many games is unpersuasive. Fourth, the “facts” at the fictional world a competitive 
game would instantiate (according to SMB) would not rationalize participants’ caring attitudes any 
more than facts at the actual world. As such, positing such a world is otiose. Fifth, it is unclear how 
SMB’s proponent can distinguish between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” games of  make-believe 
participants might play with competitive games. Lastly, competitive games require a particular kind of  
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 authenticity from their players that other make-believe games do not, which would be odd if  our 
interest in their outcomes was at least partly, and sometimes wholly, imagined. 
 I finished by sketching two possible alternatives to SMB. The first took the puzzle at face value 
and appealed to a general capacity for play (rather than make-believe specifically) to explain our 
purportedly incongruous attitudes. The second dismissed the puzzle and appealed to our motivational 
attitudes’ general capacity for volatility to explain why we can become invested in events that appear 
trivial from certain perspectives. I considered whether both of  these alternatives might still involve 
make-believe. I concluded that they might, although any claim to that effect would still be faced with 
the challenges from earlier in the paper. Much remains to be said on the matter. I will leave it to 
another occasion, and perhaps another author, to say it. 
83
 Bibliography 
 
BBC 1. (2014, July 8). Match of  the Day Live: Brazil v Germany, 2014 FIFA World Cup. London: 
BBC. 
Brown, S. (2008, May). Serious Play. (S. Brown, Performer) Pasadena, California, USA. 
Carroll, N. (1990). The Philosophy of  Horror or Paradoxes of  the Heart. Routledge: New York. 
Huizinga, J. (1938/2003). Homo Ludens: A Study of  the Play Element in Culture. London: Taylor & Francis. 
Joyce, R. (2001). The Myth of  Morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kalderon, M. E. (2005). Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kretchmar, R. S. (2007). The Normative Heights and Depths of  Play. Journal of  the Philosophy of  Sport, 
1-12. 
Kuper, S., & Szymanski, S. (2009). Soccernomics. New York: Nation Books. 
Morgan, W. J. (2007). Caring, Final Ends and Sports. Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, 7-21. 
Nagel, T. (1971). The Absurd. The Journal of  Philosophy, 716-727. 
NIfP. (2009). Play Science - The Patterns of  Play. Retrieved July 1, 2010, from The National institute for 
Play: http://nifplay.org/states_play.html 
Novak, M. (1976). The Joy of  Sports. New York: Basic Books. 
O'Brien, E., & Ellsworth, P. C. (2012). Saving the Last for Best: A Positivity Bias for End Experiences. 
Psychological Science, 163-165. 
Radford, C. (2004). How can We be Moved by the Fate of  Anna Karenina? In E. John, & D. McIver 
Lopes, Philosophy of  literature: contemporary and classic readings : an anthology (pp. 170-176). Malden, MA: 
Wiley-Blackwell. 
Schneider, A. J. (2001). Fruits, Apples, and Category Mistakes: On Sport, Games, and Play. Journal of  
the Philosophy of  Sport, 151-159. 
Singer, P. (1972). Famine, Affluence, and Morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1(3), 229-243. 
Stear, N.-H. (2009). Sadomasochism as Make-Believe. Hypatia, 21-38. 
Suits, B. (1978). The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia. Toronto: University of  Toronto Press. 
Suits, B. (1988). Tricky Triad: Games, Play, and Sport. Journal of  the Philosophy of  Sport, 1-9. 
Taylor, P. A. (manuscript). “It's Only a Game”. 
Telegraph, T. (2012, 3 26). Andy Roddick Revels in Fantastic Win over Nemesis Roger Federer to Reach Fourth 
Round in Miami. Retrieved 3 27, 2012, from Telgraph.co.uk: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/tennis/atptour/9168780/Andy-Roddick-revels-in-fantastic-
win-over-nemesis-Roger-Federer-to-reach-fourth-round-in-Miami.html 
Velleman, J. (2002). Motivation by Ideal. Philosophical Explorations, 89-103. 
Walton, K. L. (1990). Mimesis as Make-Believe. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Walton, K. L. (1993). Metaphor and Prop-oriented Make-believe. European Journal of  Philosophy, 39-57. 
Walton, K. L. (1994). Morals in Fiction and Fictional Morality. Proceedings of  the Aristotelian Society, 27-
50. 
Walton, K. L. (2008). How Marvelous! In K. Walton, Marvelous Images (pp. 3-21). New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Walton, K. L. (2010). "It's Only a Game!": Sports as Fiction. Draft Version - February 23rd. 
Walton, K. L. (2015). "It's Only a Game!": Sports as Fiction. In K. L. Walton, In Other Shoes (pp. 75-
83). New York: Oxford university Press. 
Walton, K. L. (2015). Fictionality and Imagination--Mind the Gap. In K. L. Walton, In Other Shoes: 
Music, Metaphor, Empathy, Existence (pp. 17-35). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Wertz, S. K. (1985). Representation and Expression in Sport and Art. Journal of  the Philosophy of  Sport, 
8-22. 
84
